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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. electoral system and democracy are under continued attack by foreign 
adversaries and political extremists intent on manipulating U.S. elections. Election 
officials and homeland security stakeholders must search for alternative methods to help 
strengthen the resiliency of the system. The question then becomes: How can red teaming 
and systems thinking be applied to reinforce the integrity of the U.S. electoral system? 
The goal is to analyze the system in its entirety to ensure the system in place can support 
a free and fair election and withstand an attack from an adversary. This research studies 
how the rapid implementation of universal mail-in voting created the opportunity for 
political activists to cast doubt on the validity of the election results. By applying systems 
thinking to the implementation of mail-in voting, election officials would have identified 
the additional challenges in advance and employed security protocols and alternative 
options to mitigate potential threats. To test security protocols in place, stakeholders 
should employ red teaming vulnerability probes. The vulnerability probes will assist in 
determining how effective the protocols are and if alternatives need to be established. 
Stakeholders should consider employing the use of systems thinking and red teaming to 
identify vulnerabilities and reinforce the integrity of the U.S. electoral system. 
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The U.S. Electoral System and democracy continue to be under attack by foreign 
adversaries and political extremists who intend to manipulate U.S. elections. Despite the 
diligent work of election stakeholders, vulnerabilities within the current system continue 
to provide adversaries a vehicle to disrupt U.S. elections. The recent 2016 and 2020 U.S. 
presidential elections saw foreign adversaries attempt to gain access to election 
infrastructure, initiate disinformation campaigns, and saw high-ranking U.S. officials 
challenge mail-in voting’s validity. While the electoral system attacks did not alter the 
election’s outcome, they succeeded in creating doubt in the system’s integrity. Election 
officials and homeland security stakeholders must continue to search for alternative 
methods to help strengthen the system’s resiliency.  
This thesis analyzes the current electoral process from start to finish to gain 
perspective on the current system’s resiliency. Specifically, it examines the process of 
mail-in voting to include voter identification procedures, the chain of custody, and security 
protocols. The thesis focuses on how election officials and stakeholders can strengthen the 
system and prevent future vulnerabilities caused by recent changes. While the current linear 
method used by election officials effectively solves the problem at hand, it fails to 
recognize how the solution can inadvertently cause additional vulnerabilities in other 
system components. Which leads to the question: How can red teaming and systems 
thinking be applied to reinforce the integrity of the U.S. electoral system? This thesis 
explores the potential use of systems thinking to evaluate the system and use a red teaming 
method to test the system. This project draws on data from academic literature, legislative 
testimony, and government reports, and examines the rapid implementation of mail-in 
voting in the 2020 U.S. elections as a case study.  
The thesis compares how the U.S. Secret Service methodology is akin to systems 
thinking and has successfully ensured the safety of the world’s highest leaders. The Secret 
Service and the Department of Defense have tested protocols in place through the method 
xiv 
of red teaming.1 The complexity of the U.S. electoral system makes it a perfect candidate 
for systems thinking. Systems thinking provides a framework to analyze how altering one 
element of the system can have a lasting effect on the system as a whole.2 The method 
examines three components within the system: the elements, the interconnections, and the 
purpose.3 An examination of the electoral system affords election officials the ability to 
identify the pitfalls or advantages of future changes to the system before implementation. 
By mapping out the mail-in voting process, officials would have recognized that relaxing 
security and chain of custody protocols, last-minute changes to election laws, and poor 
communication could lead the public to question the system’s integrity.  
Red teaming challenges an organization’s assumptions by imagining a system from 
an adversary’s perspective, thinking outside the box, and perpetuating an attack on the 
system to identify vulnerabilities.4 To understand the threat, U.S. election officials must 
understand the enemy’s culture and skillset and how they factor into planning an attack. 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency already recognizes its effectiveness 
in securing electronic voting infrastructure. Following the 2016 election, the creation of 
tabletop exercises helped state and local election officials mitigate an attack on their voting 
systems.5 The tabletop exercises could help test the durability of security protocols for all 
designated election critical infrastructure. While the agency made great strides in securing 
electronic infrastructure, the focus must shift to ensuring critical physical infrastructure has 
sufficient security protocols. Election officials and government agencies have been one 
step behind this nation’s adversaries in identifying vulnerabilities within the U.S. electoral 
system. Red teaming may be the answer to solving this problem. 
 
1 Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed By Thinking Like The Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), 116. 
2 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), 17. 
3 Meadows, 11. 
4 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies et al., The Red Team Handbook, v. 9 (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, 2018), 69–72, 
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/ufmcs/The_Red_Team_Handbook.pdf. 
5 Vijay D’Souza and Rebecca Gambler, Election Security: DHS Plans Are Urgently Needed to 
Address Identified Challenges before the 2020 Elections, GAO-20-267 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2020), 16–17, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704314.pdf. 
xv 
Over the last decade, foreign adversaries and high-ranking elected officials have 
tested the U.S. electoral system and exposed vulnerabilities within the system that need 
addressing to preserve its integrity. The recent implementation of universal mail-in voting 
provided the perfect case study to test the application of systems thinking and red teaming. 
Therefore, based on the case study findings, this thesis recommends two proposals for 
inserting after-action reports in which systems thinking methodologies are utilized for the 
final analysis and the use of vulnerability probes to test the resiliency of election 
infrastructure. The recommendations can identify current and future vulnerabilities within 
the electoral system and provide the opportunity to test solutions before implementation. 
The proposals will require buy-in from election stakeholders and additional funding to 
obtain the personnel qualified to perform the task. While election officials must consider 
the challenges to implementing the recommendations, they must also consider the 
importance of maintaining a secure and resilient electoral system. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can red teaming and systems thinking be applied to reinforce the integrity of 
the U.S. electoral system? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
On the evening of November 7, 2000, the nation held its breath as the Presidential 
Election was coming to a close that night.1 As the Electoral College’s majority numbers 
trickled in, it soon became obvious no clear winner would be declared that night. When 
Americans awoke the next morning, they learned that Florida’s 25 electoral votes, 
hampered by hand recounts, machine recounts, absentee ballots, and outdated punch-card 
technology, were thwarting anyone from declaring victory.2 This situation should have 
served as an early warning siren to states, and it was about to be deafening. 
Federal, state, and local governments have been trying to rectify flaws in the U.S. 
voting system for more than two decades since the 2000 election came down to the State 
of Florida. Due to the slim margin of votes in favor of George W. Bush, a recount was 
conducted per Florida law.3 The results of this recount raised the question of why Florida 
was still using this outdated punch-card technology that forced many states to re-evaluate 
their voting machines and processes.  
The American Civil Liberties Union filed lawsuits against five states, including 
Florida, for using outmoded punch-card machines, which it claimed violated individuals’ 
equal protection rights.4 Consequently, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 
 
1 Ron Elving, “The Florida Recount of 2000: A Nightmare That Goes on Haunting,” National Public 
Radio, November 12, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/666812854/the-florida-recount-of-2000-a-
nightmare-that-goes-on-haunting. 
2 Elving. 
3 Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 3–4. 
4 Daniel P. Tokaji, “The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights,” South 
Carolina Law Review 57, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 689–734. 
2 
2002, which provided funding for states to replace their outdated voting systems with new 
touchscreen computers.5 However, by 2006, only 38%of states had adopted such new 
technology.6  
While replacing outdated voting machines with new technology was a step in the 
right direction, it failed to address election system deficiencies, such as inaccurate voter 
registration databases, partisan involvement in post-election audits, and poorly trained poll 
workers.7 The beginning of the new millennium saw the emergence of some novel election 
concerns, as well as the recurrence of some more familiar problems, such as partisan bias. 
First, in 2004, the Ohio secretary of state faced election abuse allegations from Democrats 
because he had been the former head of President Bush’s re-election campaign in Ohio.8  
Additionally, in 2008, the Minnesota Senate race was brought into question when 
Democrats requested a recount to include over 1,000 absentee votes, which had initially 
been dismissed by local election judges.9  
Then came the 2016 election, which opened the proverbial Pandora’s box of 
technological problems, and exposed new weaknesses, such as foreign interference in U.S. 
elections.10  
The following May, then Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert 
Mueller special counsel to the Department of Justice’s inquiry into Russian interference in 
 
5 “The Help America Vote Act of 2002,” Department of Justice, August 6, 2015, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/help-america-vote-act-2002. 
6 Nelson W. Polsby et al., Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 13th 
ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2011), 206.  
7 Hasen, The Voting Wars. 
8 Bruce E. Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert, Democracy in the States: Experiments in 
Election Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2008), 5. 
9 Jay Weiner, This Is Not Florida: How Al Franken Won the Minnesota Senate Race (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xviii. 
10 Katie Bo Williams, “DHS Designates Election Systems as ‘Critical Infrastructure,’” The Hill, 
January 6, 2017, https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313132-dhs-designates-election-systems-as-
critical-infrastructure. 
3 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.11 The subsequent report revealed that voter registration 
databases in the 2016 elections had been successfully infiltrated by Russian intelligence 
organizations or their proxies.12 
Although no evidence of tampering with voter registration databases or voting 
machines was found, the existing voting infrastructure was deemed vulnerable to attacks 
from foreign adversaries.13 As the 2020 election rapidly approached, Americans were 
understandably anxious about the integrity and security of the U.S. election infrastructure; 
voter fraud and foreign interference ranked among their top concerns.14 Meanwhile, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) have taken the lead in collaborating with state and local agencies to 
improve election security.15  
CISA has made great strides in forging stronger relationships with local, state, and 
territorial election officials and created best practices for cybersecurity and intelligence 
sharing all the while failing to look within the DHS family for an affiliate agency to 
collaborate on election vulnerabilities.  
One potential electoral institution partner, the U.S. Secret Service, has successfully 
employed a 360-degree security approach to protecting the president of the United States 
and other high-ranking officials since 1902. The Secret Service analyzes each component 
of a venue or facility and determines how one area may affect the whole, where the threat 
may come from, and how to mitigate it.  
 
11 Rod J. Rosenstein, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 
2016 Presidential Election and Related Manners (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/download. 
12 “The Mueller Report Exposed Weaknesses in U.S. Democratic Institutions that H.R. 1 Would 
Address,” Brennan Center for Justice, July 10, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/mueller-report-exposed-weaknesses-us-democratic-institutions-hr-1-would. 
13 Brennan Center for Justice. 
14 Thad Hall, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “Poll Workers and the Vitality of Democracy: 
An Early Assessment,” PS: Political Science & Politics 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 647–54, https://doi.org/
10.1017/S104909650707103X. 
15 Vijay D’Souza and Rebecca Gambler, Election Security: DHS Plans Are Urgently Needed to 
Address Identified Challenges before the 2020 Elections, GAO-20-267 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2020), 2, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704314.pdf. 
4 
Such a methodology could be effective at revealing vulnerabilities and plotting 
solutions for the U.S. electoral system. Moreover, CISA and the Secret Service have both 
used red teaming to combat threats, though the agency’s employment of the method has 
been confined to the cybersecurity realm.16 In fact, the agency has even assisted other DHS 
agencies with cyber penetration efforts on their networks.17  
It would be a logical next step for CISA and election institutions to consider 
partnering with the Secret Service in adopting a red-teaming methodology for the electoral 
system. CISA would be playing the blue team’s role by defending its “virtual ground” 
based on its current best practices. In contrast, Secret Service teams that work in both cyber 
and site protection fields attempt to penetrate and socially engineer their way into the 
voting systems and election storage facilities. Additionally, the data gleaned from the 
virtual exercises could then be passed on to the local or state governments, much like the 
cybersecurity agency releases warning bulletins to national corporations on matters of 
software vulnerabilities and malware.  
To have faith in the U.S. election system, the agencies assisting in the security of 
elections must have institutional trust. While CISA is a relatively new federal agency, the 
Secret Service was established in 1865 and entrusted with safeguarding U.S. currency. The 
Secret Service upholds its personnel to the motto of “worthy of trust and confidence.” The 
Secret Service dual mission has successfully protected the U.S. financial system and 
hundreds of world leaders over the last 150 years. 
Moreover, federal, state, local, and territorial governments would then approach 
election security as the Secret Service approaches security advances for the officials they 
protect; a 360-degree ring of protection that starts long before citizens cast their ballots on 
election day. 
 
16 Sean Michael Kerner, “DHS Using Red Team Approach to Identify Cyber-Security Issues,” eWeek, 
August 13, 2018, https://www.eweek.com/security/dhs-using-red-team-approach-to-improve-national-
cyber-security. 




C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review addresses the current state of security and resilience of the 
U.S. election system and methods implemented since 2000 to secure them. The first section 
focuses on cited vulnerabilities to election system technology. The second addresses how 
election management bodies are created and what effect they have on election security.  
1. Technology in U.S. Election Infrastructure 
Some studies already analyzed how voting machines are vulnerable to hackers and 
foreign state actors. A group of election subject matter experts and industry professionals 
co-wrote DEF CON 27: Voting Machine Hacking Village, a report detailing current 
electronic voting machines’ vulnerability to attacks.18  
During the experiments, computer scientists had access over three days to 100 
voting machines currently used in U.S. elections, and participants used the tools in their 
possession to alter votes and infiltrate the voting machines, some of which had been 
identified as vulnerable over a decade ago.19  
This study also raised concerns over the supply chain for voting machine 
components, many of which are manufactured overseas in countries often accused of 
election interference. For example, Alexa Corse concurs with the 2019 Voting Village 
findings that voting machines are particularly susceptible to hacking because many contain 
components from China and Russia, adversaries of the United States.20  
To drive home her point, Corse references a study conducted by a risk-management 
company called Interos, which explored the risk of using international components in U.S. 
 
18 Matt Blaze et al., DEF CON 27: Voting Machine Hacking Village (Furlong, PA: Voting Village, 
2019), 2, https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2027/voting-village-report-defcon27.pdf.  
19 Blaze et al., 2. 
20 Alexa Corse, “Voting-Machine Parts Made by Foreign Suppliers Stir Security Concerns,” Wall 
Street Journal, December 16, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/voting-machine-parts-made-by-foreign-
suppliers-stir-security-concerns-11576494003. 
6 
voting machines. Interos recommends that voting machine vendors scrutinize parts 
supplied by foreign companies.21  
Various methods can be used to conduct an attack on electronic voting machines. 
Computer scientist Alex Halderman has published a series of studies since 2006 on the 
vulnerabilities of election systems and applied threat models to identify potential 
attackers.22 According to him, malicious code on memory cards or USB devices, which 
contain software for ballot design and procedures for tallying votes, might be a mode of 
attack.23  
Independently funded research by Shackelford et al. analyzed national case studies 
to assist the U.S. electoral system in creating best practices for combating cyber-attacks.24 
While this study recognizes the same vulnerabilities to the voting machines that Halderman 
identified, it draws attention to five key areas within the electoral system susceptible to 
hacking: pre-election rhetoric, poll books, electronic voting machines, machine tabulation, 
and post-election dissemination of information.25  
Some experts on election integrity have traced the decline of the integrity of U.S. 
elections. One such group of experts—Pippa Norris, Alessandro Nai, and Max 
Grompling—conducted a quantitative study called the Election Integrity Project to 
evaluate election integrity worldwide. The Project surveyed U.S.-based political scientists 
to measure their regions’ election security. On the perception of electoral integrity (PEI) 




22 J. Alex Halderman, Testimony: Russian Interference in the 2016 Elections (Washington, DC: 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2017), 2. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/os-ahalderman-062117.pdf. 
23 Halderman, 4. 
24 Scott Shackelford et al., “Making Democracy Harder to Hack,” University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform 50 (2017): 629–68.  
25 Shackelford et al., 636. 
26 Pippa Norris, Alessandro Nai, and Max Gromping, “The Electoral Integrity Project EIP,” Harvard 
Dataverse, December 15, 2016, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YXUV3W. 
7 
The project identified hacking by an adversary as a top challenge within the current 
election system. In a solo project, Norris studied the hacking of voter registration databases 
and its effect on election integrity, including the Illinois and Arizona voter registration 
databases that cyber criminals accessed in a 2016 attempt to obtain voter records.27 
Norris’s study revealed it would take only a few hacks on registration databases or voting 
machines to cast doubt on election results among voters.28 
While voter registration databases, voting machines, and their components are 
vulnerable to attacks, assessments conducted by CISA’s Department of National 
Cybersecurity Assessments and Technical Team revealed that any time information 
technology is used to support critical infrastructure, it becomes vulnerable. Moreover, all 
systems are equally vulnerable.29  
2. Election Management Bodies 
Election management bodies play a major role in the U.S. electoral system and are 
vulnerable to manipulation based on their election responsibilities, from organizing, to 
monitoring, to certifying elections. While plenty of literature is available on voting 
technology, little scholarly work has addressed election management.  
Toby James, a subject matter expert on election management, explored the 
strengths and vulnerabilities of international election authorities.30 He focused on five key 
components with election management: process design, resource investment, service 
output, service outcomes, and stakeholder satisfaction (PROSeS).31  
 
27 Pippa Norris, Why American Elections Are Flawed (and How to Fix Them) (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2017), 15. 
28 Norris, 16. 
29 Office of Inspector General, Progress Made, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Secure the 
Election Infrastructure (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 3, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-03/OIG-19-24-Feb19.pdf. 
30 Toby James, Comparative Electoral Management: Performance, Networks and Instruments 
(London: Routledge, 2019), 3–17, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315545172. 
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Within the PROSeS framework, the five elements comprise variables for 
evaluation. For example, process design compromises the variables of public participation, 
probity and impartiality, and accountability.32 James’s framework helped to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of both the U.K. and Canadian systems, whose electoral 
management structures diverge. By gaining this knowledge, the two countries could create 
policies to improve their electoral management bodies.33 
Holly Ann Garnett, who also measured multiple variables, argues that the capacity 
of election management is an indicator of electoral integrity. Garnett defines capacity as 
“the ability to perform functions and achieve . . . goals.”34 
Garnett explores whether the quality of content on election websites correlates with 
high election integrity. This cross-national study from 2012 to 2014 analyzed the websites 
of 99 international election management bodies by measuring 20 variables and quantifying 
the results on a Mokken scale of one through three, where three reflects the greatest 
capacity.35 On the Mokken scale, the United States scored between 1.50 and 1.9.36 
Garnett’s study, the first of its kind, revealed the significance of the capacity of election 
management bodies. The higher the confidence in the election official, the more assured 
the voter is in the electoral process. 
Some scholars would argue that poll workers are a key factor in determining the 
integrity of an election system because having the power to deny someone the right to vote 
can affect voter confidence in U.S. elections.  
 
32 James, 62–63. 
33 James, 84–85. 
34 Holly Ann Garnett, “Evaluating Electoral Management Body Capacity,” International Political 
Science Review 40, no. 3 (2019): 335–53. 
35 Garnett, 340. 
36 Garnett, 342. 
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Atkeson et al. revealed how vital poll workers are to maintaining election security. 
This study analyzed whether poll workers discriminated against minority voters in 
requesting identification.37  
The study surveyed New Mexico poll workers and voters and analyzed whether 
voter identification laws were administered.38 It revealed that poll workers who support 
voter identification laws are more likely to request a form of identification from a voter 
therefore demonstrating a lack of consistency amongst poll workers does exist.39  
Burden et al. analyzed what transpires at the polling station by reviewing the 
incident logs that contain voter complaints.40 This analysis of 66,000 incident from four 
different elections in Wisconsin suggested that voters experienced few problems when 
voting.41  
Self-reporting by elections officials has many advantages although respondents 
may sometimes be too embarrassed to report mistakes or even social biases. This study 
revealed that election administrators needed to focus on how the polling location was 
organized in an effort to prevent such incidents.  
In a similar study, Sara Rinfret, Christina Barsky, and Samuel Scott conducted a 
telephone survey comprising eight questions regarding the voter’s experience and 
confidence in election administrators in Missoula, Montana.42 The researchers utilized a 
five-point scale to index the results, which revealed voters in Missoula had high confidence 
in their election officials.43 These studies highlight the impact election administrators can 
 
37 Lonna Rae Atkeson et al., “Who Asks for Voter Identification? Explaining Poll-Worker 
Discretion,” Journal of Politics 76, no. 4 (2014): 944–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381614000528.  
38 Atkeson et al., 944. 
39 Atkeson et al., 947–948. 
40 Barry C. Burden et al., “What Happens at the Polling Place: Using Administrative Data to Look 
Inside Elections,” Public Administration Review 77, no. 3 (2017): 354–64.  
41 Burden et al., 354–355. 
42 Sara Rinfret, Christinia Barsley, and Scott Samuel, “Public Perceptions, Elections, Administration, 
and the Role of Street Level Bureaucrats,” Public Administration Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 2018): 
493–515. 
43 Rinfret, Barsley, and Samuel, 501–502. 
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have on the U.S. electoral system. The more confident voters are in the official who 
oversees their polling location, the greater the trust in the overall system. 
Some experts have attempted to explore the correlation between election integrity 
and voters’ confidence in the accuracy of their votes, such as the study conducted by R. 
Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Morgan H. Llewellyn on the 2004 election.44 In a poll 
of 2,793 randomly selected voters, researchers found that 11% lacked confidence in the 
accuracy of their vote, and the higher the confidence in the election system, the more likely 
registered voters are to vote.45 
For example, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of 9,451 adults to 
determine whether they believed their vote was recorded and counted accurately in the 
2018 midterm election.46 The study revealed 80% had confidence that their local election 
administration counted the votes accurately, and 70% were confident in accuracy 
nationwide.47 These studies provide greater insight into voters’ confidence in the U.S. 
election system. 
While numerous studies have explored the various components of the electoral 
system and their impact on election security, no study has evaluated how each component 
interacts with the others, which ultimately can affect the overall system. As a result, this 
thesis examines how a systems thinking approach and red teaming can be applied to 
improve election security by analyzing each of the components, their interactions, and 
finally, the vulnerabilities and how to fix them. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The U.S. electoral system is a complex, decentralized system made up of numerous 
election administrations, laws, and technologies and influenced by political partisanship. 
 
44 R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Morgan H. Llewellyn, “Are Americans Confident Their 
Ballots Are Counted?,” Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 (July 2008): 754–66. 
45 Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn, 758. 
46 Pew Research Center, Public Expects Gridlock, Deeper Divisions with Changed Political 
Landscape (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2018), 1, https://www.people-press.org/2018/11/15/
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Researchers and government officials have often overlooked the interconnection of the 
system’s components and neglected testing their resilience. This thesis studies how the 
Secret Service conducts security advances through a system’s thinking approach and tests 
its process often utilized by the Department of Defense (DOD), a concept known as “red 
teaming” and how it can be applied to election security. 
Systems thinking provides a framework to analyze how altering one element of the 
system can have a lasting effect on the system as a whole.48 The systems thinking approach 
examines three components within a system; the elements, the interconnections, and the 
purpose.49 Through this approach, government officials can determine the purpose of the 
U.S. electoral system and integrate a feedback loop to determine how a change to one 
component depends on another. 
The U.S. Secret Service methodology is akin to systems thinking by revealing how 
the agency approaches security advances, how effective this method has been at protecting 
the United States’ highest leaders, and how it may be used to modify the U.S. electoral 
system. For the Secret Service to accomplish its mission of ensuring the world’s highest 
leaders’ safety, it must understand the impact each component of an advance has on the 
other. When conducting advances, the Secret Service relies on various components within 
the agency, such as the motorcade section and counter-sniper section, to assess their area 
of expertise for vulnerabilities.50 Once the vulnerabilities have been identified, the various 
components converge to devise a security plan. By discussing each section’s security plan, 
the advance can determine how each plan may affect the others. For continuity, meetings 
involving agents from each subsection are held at the end of the day to review the overall 
security plan. 
 
48 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), 17. 
49 Meadows, 11. 
50 “The Protective Mission,” Secret Service, accessed July 3, 2020, https://www.secretservice.gov/
protection/#who. 
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After major security events, the Secret Service conducts after-action reports to 
determine the executed security plan’s effectiveness.51 Even if an event is successful, the 
Secret Service sees the benefit of breaking down the security plan piece by piece to identify 
if any holes were exposed on game day or if plans should be altered in the future to increase 
security. The Secret Service assesses if the appropriate amount of staffing was utilized, 
communication effectiveness with law enforcement partners, and security ingress and 
egress areas. Problems and recommendations are documented in the after-action report and 
available to the agents who will hand the next major event.  
Red teaming challenges an organization’s assumptions by imagining a system from 
an adversary’s perspective, thinking outside the box, and perpetuating an attack on the 
system to identify vulnerabilities.52 The DOD and Secret Service commonly use physical 
and analytical red teaming to train and prepare for and respond to worst-case scenarios. 
The DOD has been using the concept of red teaming since the Cold War.53 It often utilizes 
the method to test strategy plans for upcoming missions, the effectiveness of the latest 
technology, and security for military installations all over the world.54 The Secret Service 
has embraced the concept of red teaming and conducted several tabletop exercises, 
simulations, and vulnerability probes to assess security plans for its various protective 
missions.55 To understand the threat truly, U.S. election officials must understand the 
enemy’s culture and skill set and how they factor into planning an attack. 
A study completed by the Defense Science Board in 2003 revealed, “We believe 
red teaming is especially important now… Aggressive red teams challenge emerging 
 
51 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, United States Secret Service After-
Action Review of Inaugural Security (Redacted) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2009), 7, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_10-04_Oct09.pdf. 
52 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies et al., The Red Team Handbook, v. 9 (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, 2018), 69–72, 
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/ufmcs/The_Red_Team_Handbook.pdf. 
53 Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed By Thinking Like the Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), 26. 
54 Zenko, xxi. 
55 Edward Connors, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law 
Enforcement (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Law & Justice, 2007), 65. 
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operational concepts in order to discover weaknesses before read adversaries do. Red 
teaming also tempers the complacency that often follows success.”56 For the last decade, 
foreign adversaries have tested the U.S. electoral system in hopes of identifying gaps that 
can be exploited to their benefit. Election officials and government agencies have been one 
step behind this nation’s adversaries in identifying vulnerabilities within the U.S. electoral 
system. Red teaming may be the answer to solving this problem. 
Step one involves identifying the challenges facing the U.S. electoral system from 
the 2000 election to the recent 2020 election. This thesis highlights the policies 
implemented to improve the system, the government’s designation of the system as critical 
infrastructure, and the establishment of greater federal oversight.  
Step two explains the U.S. electoral system from start to finish. Election 
stakeholders must understand how the framers envisioned the electoral process, from its 
implementation, and how it evolved and became more complex over time. To reinforce the 
system’s resiliency, election officials, legislatures, and government agencies must have a 
complete understanding of each step along the way.  
Step three demonstrates how systems thinking and red teaming can be applied to 
specific components within the U.S. electoral system. States began implementing universal 
mail-in voting as an alternative to in-person voting to protect Americans during a global 
pandemic. Many states’ rapid implementation failed to recognize how this change would 
directly impact other components within the system. Mapping out a systems thinking 
diagram could help election officials identify how the potential change may inadvertently 
prove to do more harm than good. Lastly, thinking like this nation’s adversaries through 
red teaming will help election officials identify future vulnerabilities and determine how 
resilient the U.S. electoral system will be during an attack. It would afford election officials 
the time they need to establish protocols on how to mitigate the damage if an attack were 
to happen, because right now, this country is always one step behind. 
 
56 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense 
Science Board Task Force on The Role and Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2003), Memorandum for Chairman, Defense Science Board, https://apps.dtic.mil/
dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a430100.pdf. 
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The thesis’s final step is to synthesize the information gleaned from the study and 
apply it to current election vulnerabilities. Demonstrate how the Cyber agency and the DHS 
can study how other agencies and the military have successfully applied the methodology 
of systems thinking and red teaming to its missions; and how it can help identify potential 
election security vulnerabilities. The results of this thesis highlight a set of 
recommendations to reinforce the resiliency and security of the U.S. electoral system. 
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II. U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM (2000–2020) 
Electoral integrity first showed signs of cracking in the 2000 presidential election, 
which led the public to question electoral security. Since then, the United States has 
experienced the creation of the Help America Vote Act and the Election Assistance, 
funding to upgrade voting machines but not uniformity, an uptick in legal challenges to 
election results, and foreign interference through hacking and disinformation campaigns. 
These challenges have only diminished voter confidence. This chapter analyzes the 
aforementioned vulnerabilities that have arisen since the 2000 U.S. Presidential election to 
the 2016 Presidential election. 
A. 2000 ELECTION 
The fate of the U.S. Presidential election rested entirely on Florida. With the 
election too close to call, Florida law required that the votes be run through the same 
tabulation machines once again to determine whether the machines had caused an error.57 
Unsatisfied with the machine recount, presidential nominee Al Gore requested a hand 
recount in a few Democratic-leaning counties (Figure 1).58 Over the next 36 days, America 
learned how flawed its election system was, made manifest in outdated voting machines 
and poorly designed ballots, to weak election laws and partisan election officials, to the 
questionable validity of absentee votes.59 
 
57 Hasen, The Voting Wars, 12. 
58 Hasen, 12.  
59 Hasen, 11–40.  
16 
 
Figure 1. Broward County Judge Reviews Punch Card Ballot in Florida 
Recount.60 
One of the many questions that arose in Florida involved the use of outdated voting 
machines, chiefly punch-card machines.61 Of the different machines used in Florida, the 
punch-card machine, which represented 20% of all machines nationwide, proved unreliable 
and scored the worst in vote accuracy.62 A punch card machine utilized a metal pin to 
punch a hole next to the name of the candidate of their choosing, which produced a hanging 
chad.63 The ballot design, called the butterfly ballot, only exacerbated the problems with 
the machines in Florida, and Democrats argued the design led voters to select the 
unintended candidate by mistake.64 The ballot design was heavily scrutinized in Palm 
Beach County, where the election supervisor had placed the candidates’ names on both 
sides of the holes to assist the elderly in navigating the vast number of candidates.65 The 
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ballot design combined with the machine’s inaccuracy led to confusion among voters and 
incorrect votes.66 
Ballot design and voting machines were not the only controversy in Florida, so were 
the laws governing the recount. Florida election laws failed to provide clear and concise 
guidelines for determining the intent of a vote or conducting a recount.67 Florida election 
laws dictate it is left up to the Chief Election Official, Secretary of State, to interpret and 
certify election results.68 Democrats were particularly concerned over how the Republican 
Secretary interpretation of absentee ballot laws in Florida would benefit George W. 
Bush.69 For ballots to count, Florida law states the ballots must contain an election date 
postmark.70 The Secretary read the law to state that as long as the ballots encompassed a 
foreign postmark and were received within the 10-day allotment period, the votes should 
be counted.71 
Furthering the problem was the fact that the Secretary of State was the co-chair of 
Presidential nominee Bush in Florida.72 The perceived conflict of interest and imprecise 
laws lead both parties to file lawsuits following the election.73 The Gore campaign opted 
to request a manual recount to protect voters from outdated voting machines’ flaws.74 A 
recount in several counties sought to decipher voter’s intent on ballots initially disqualified 
due to mechanical error. Republicans filed a lawsuit and went before the Florida Supreme 
Court who ruled in favor of the Democrats. Once again, the Bush campaign shared their 
dismay by appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court. The case went before the Supreme Court, 
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which ruled in favor of Bush, which ended the Florida recount.75 While Americans were 
relieved finally to have an official President, it highlighted many flaws in the U.S. electoral 
system. 
1. The Help Act and the Election Commission 
In the wake of the 2000 election, Congress passed election reform through the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002.76 Congress sought assistance from state and local governments 
to determine the area’s most in need of funding to improve election administration.77 The 
Help Act appropriated federal funding for upgraded voting machines, the creation of 
statewide voter registration databases, education for poll workers, and provisional voting 
were key components to the Help Act.78 
Prior to the Help Act, the Federal Election Commission’s Office of Election 
Administration provided federal election administration assistance.79 Federal Election 
Administrative oversight was housed under the Federal Election Commission with the 
primary duties to provide information to the public, conduct research, and create guidelines 
for voting systems.80 The 2000 election caused legislators to re-evaluate the role of the 
Feds.81 Congress saw the need for an independent bi-partisan agency to oversee the 
distribution of federal funding to the states, testing of voting machines, conducting 
research, and creating administrative guidelines outlined in the Help Act.82 Under the 
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passage of the Help Act, the Election Assistance Commission would take over the primary 
responsibilities held by the previous federal election administrators.83  
2. Voting Technology 
The Election Commission would provide the funding the states needed to upgrade 
election technology.84 States first had to qualify for assistance from the Help Act and agree 
to replace the outdated voting infrastructure before November 2004 to receive funding or 
request an extension until 2006.85 The new infrastructure would afford voters the ability 
to verify and change their vote prior to submitting.86 Under Title III of the Help Act, the 
voting system needed to be handicapped accessible, provide a paper copy of each ballot 
cast, and provide alternative languages.87 Nevertheless, the Help Act failed to standardize 
what type of voting machines should be purchased, which thus allowed each state the 
authority to purchase whatever electronic voting machine it deemed appropriate.88 The 
quick fix led to states purchasing machines without doing their due diligence to verify the 
security procedures in place for the machines.89 The idea of votes being stored on the 
computer’s memory was concerning for some state election officials.90 In an effort to calm 
fears, the Commission offered states the ability to have the voting infrastructure tested and 
certified.91 
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While the Help Act provided much needed funding to upgrade voting systems, 
delayed funding, lack of faith in the security of new systems, and lack of mandatory testing 
ultimately contributed to minor changes.92  
3. Voter Identification, Databases, and Provisional Voting 
The 2000 election highlighted flaws with Florida’s voter registration database. 
Unfortunately, for Florida, and the third party company they utilized for removal, they 
inadvertently removed 2,000 individuals who had been mislabeled.93 This error led to 
legally registered voters being denied the right to vote due a clerical error.94 This error 
resulted in lawsuits and the creation of independent studies to determine what 
recommendations should be made towards election reform for voter registration 
databases.95 
The Carter-Ford Commission, a bi-partisan commission, recommended that voters 
produce a form of government identification or equivalent when registering and casting a 
vote on Election Day.96 It seemed the public agreed with the Carter Commission; a Gallup 
poll taken in 2016 suggested that 80% of surveyed Americans were in favor of presenting 
a form of identification at polling locations.97 The Help Act did not include a requirement 
to provide government identification at the time of voting, but it did enact the requirement 
to provide a valid id or proof of residency when registering to vote via mail in a new 
district.98  
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Prior to the Help Act, states had the ability to house voter registration data in the 
mechanism of their choosing. In an effort to streamline voter registration information, the 
Help Act requires each state to create and maintain a computerized electronic database of 
registered voters.99 This requirement will increase the security of the information, make it 
readily accessible to election officials and poll workers, and provide the ability to link to 
the state’s Department of Motor Vehicle and social security offices to verify the accuracy 
of the information.100 The Help Act offered guidance to states on building the database but 
did not provide any formal requirements for the states to meet.101 
While the Help Act made improvements to voter registration and databases, the 
lack of uniformity among states on verifying voters’ identity has led to misinterpretations 
of the law by poll workers, which led to some voters being turned away on election day.102 
States themselves set the laws regarding what identification is needed to register to vote, 
cast a ballot, or vote via mail-in or absentee ballot.103 
In an attempt to prevent voters from being denied their right to vote due to an error 
within a voter registration database, the Help Act required election officials to allow the 
individual to cast a provisional ballot.104 If voters arrive at a polling location and their 
name is absent from the pollbook, or the address does not match the address on the voter’s 
ID, then the voter will be allowed to cast a provisional ballot. Once election officials verify 
a registered voter did indeed cast the provisional ballot, it is added to the official count.105 
Voters and candidates are worried that provisional ballots are not being counted during 
elections. The Election Commission reported that from 2006 to 2016, 31% of provisional 
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ballots were not counted.106 This statistic could lead voters to distrust election results. 
These statistics give validity to claims of voter suppression and voter fraud. Any vote not 
accurately counted is a failure on the part of the voting system. In the 2016 Presidential 
election, the Commission reported over 2.4 million provisional ballots were cast.107 It is 
clear from the number of provisional ballots cast in 2016 that election administrators and 
the Commission need to take a closer look at how to improve the accuracy of voter 
registration databases and provide information to the public on voter identification laws to 
prevent voters from doubting the election results.  
4. Recounts and Lawsuits 
The 2000 election was just the beginning of many recounts and lawsuits to be filed 
because of an election and election management decisions.  
In 2004, Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell made the ill-advised decision to 
serve as President Bush’s re-election team’s co-chair.108 Due to controversial decisions on 
voter registration forms and denial of provisional ballots, the public began to doubt partisan 
officials’ ability to be impartial during election issues.109 Many voters in Ohio saw it was 
a clear abuse of power since his decisions seem to favor President Bush.110 Blackwell’s 
decisions resulted in long lines, challenges casting a provisional vote, and some never 
casting a vote at all.111 The idea that the state election official is abusing his position will 
lead to voters to lose faith in the integrity of the election system. Citizens should be able to 
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Unfortunately, for Ohio, the 2008 Presidential election was just as divisive as the 
2004 election. This time, the Republicans were accusing the Democratic Secretary of 
interpreting election laws in favor of Democrats.112 The chief election official made 
controversial decisions on an absentee voter’s qualification status and voter registration 
laws.  
In this particular case, the issue came down to an administrative issue regarding 
absentee ballot requests.113 For absentee ballots to be sent out to voters, the voters must 
include a statement that they are “qualified voters.”114 According to Ohio law, voters must 
include the statement but do not have to check the box next to the statement for the ballot 
to be sent out.115The McCain campaign checked the box next to the statement for the one 
million registered Republican voters in Ohio.116 When forms began to show up without 
the box checked, Secretary Brunner advised county election officials to forgo sending the 
absentee ballot and stated they were not “qualified voters.”117 This situation led to another 
showdown, and this time in the Ohio Supreme Court, which ruled against Secretary 
Brunner.118 
A battle over absentee ballots was not the only run-in Brunner had with Republicans 
in 2008 over election laws. This time, Republicans challenged Brunner’s interpretation of 
voter registration laws.119 Republicans argued a loophole that combined the requirement 
for voters to register 30 days prior to the election. The “early voting program” granting 
voters the ability to cast their votes 35 days before the election would lead to fraud.120 
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Democrats capitalized on the ability to register new voters and have them vote on the same 
day.121 This loophole led Democrats to gain approximately 13,000 new registered voters 
who registered and voted the same day in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election.122 
Republicans called foul, arguing to the Ohio Supreme Court that it violated the voter 
registration law of having to register 30 days prior to the election.123 The Ohio Supreme 
Court disagreed, stating since the vote was not counted until Election Day, it was not in 
violation of the law.124 
The Ohio Court cases have once again shown a light on the chief’s election 
official’s inability to be bi-partisan. These issues need to be addressed to restore the 
public’s faith in U.S. election officials and trust in the U.S. election system. 
B. 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The 2016 presidential election introduced the American public and government 
officials to a whole new set of election challenges. Federal, state, and local election officials 
were facing the threat of foreign interference through social media, voting machines, and 
voter registration databases. The American people heard terms from the U.S. government, 
such as disinformation, deep fakes, fake bots, and hacking.  
1. Social Media and Fake News 
Americans have relied on social media outlets for their news for most of the 21st 
century.125 A Pew Research Center survey taken in January 2016 revealed that 35% of 
young Americans between 18 and 29 received their election and political information from 
social media.126 Social media has provided the opportunity for everyone to have a 
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voice.127 The challenge with everyone having a voice is it affords an individual the ability 
to post or forward any story without oversight or fact checking.128 Traditional journalists 
must verify facts before they are published.129  
The terms disinformation and misinformation became extremely popular during the 
2016 election and social media platforms were a catalyst for spreading the information.130 
Misinformation is defined as taking the information believed to be true and sharing it with 
others.131 Disinformation, however, is purposefully spreading incorrect information to 
others in an attempt to manipulate them.132 Studies have revealed Facebook was the 
primary source of disinformation among American voters.133 A Pew Research Center 
survey in November 2016 revealed 79% of internet users used Facebook.134 Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated the following when testifying before the joint Senate 
committee: 
It’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent these tools from being 
used for harm as well. That goes for fake news, foreign interference in 
elections, and hate speech, as well as developers and data privacy. We didn’t 
take a broad enough view of our responsibility, and that was a big mistake. 
It was my mistake, and I’m sorry. I started Facebook, I run it, and I’m 
responsible for what happens here.135 
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Social media is responsible for 40% of the visits to “fake news” sites.136 Even if 
“fake news” was not responsible for the overall election results, it might have directly 
impacted a specific set of voters.137  
Ohio State University researchers conducted a study in 2016 on 2012 Obama 
voters.138 To determine how disinformation plays into elections, the researchers provided 
false news statements about Hillary Clinton to the surveyors.139 The results revealed that 
those who believed the “fake news” were 3.9 times more likely to vote against Clinton in 
the election.140  
The Internet Research Agency was responsible for the majority of the 
disinformation.141 The Research Agency entered into a social media campaign to cause 
chaos and discord among Americans.142 The agency completed its due diligence on social 
media apps for political sites in an effort to perfect its manipulation campaign.143 It 
engaged in identity theft, training for social media specialists, round-the-clock monitoring 
and posting on sites, creating group pages, political advertisements, and providing 
derogatory information on Hillary Clinton.144 Several rallies created under stolen U.S. 
identities were organized in an effort to garner support for Trump.145  
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The Research Agency favored the use of Facebook and Twitter in its disinformation 
campaign.146 Facebook and Twitter collectively determined 4,284 accounts were 
maintained and controlled by representatives of the agency and exposed to over 127 million 
individuals.147 They released this information through various online personas in an effort 
to conceal their true identity.148  
While it might never be honestly known if Russia’s manipulation of disinformation 
directly affected the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, it has been proven that 
a disinformation campaign was utilized on social media apps as a mechanism to influence 
voters’ opinions of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.  
2. Vulnerability of Election Infrastructure 
Not only did Russia utilize social media as a means of “information warfare,” but 
agents working on behalf of the Russian government infiltrated the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) emails and states voting machines, and voter registration databases.149 
The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
(GRU), Russian Army Intelligence, hacked into the DNC email accounts and the Clinton 
campaign and then released the documents and emails under bogus identities.150 Spear 
phishing was a tool Russian Intelligence used to access DNC and Clinton campaign staffers 
and volunteers’ access credentials.151 Once the GRU was able to gain access to the 
networks, they installed malware that allowed for data transfers, the ability to take 
screenshots, and log keystrokes.152 The information retrieved from these databases 
involved campaign strategy, information on Clinton’s competitor, and financial 
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information.153 They were strategic in its release of the information. For example, almost 
immediately after the media released disparaging information on Donald Trump, they 
would release illegally obtained emails and documents involving Hillary Clinton.154 
The GRU’s hacking mission continued with the scoping out of various election 
websites to identify vulnerable penetration points within election infrastructure.155 A DHS 
investigation revealed Russia’s intent to infiltrate all 50 states’ election websites, but the 
Russian Intelligence failed to access most states’ websites.156 However, they were able to 
penetrate Illinois’s state election infrastructure and gain access to over 200,000 voter 
registration content.157 This access gave them the ability to manipulate voters’ information 
that caused potential voting implications on Election Day.158 While they did gain access, 
investigators did not find hard evidence of altered voter registration information.159 
Overall, it is believed that the they infiltrated a small number of state election sites, but 
confirmation of actual information being altered has not been found.  
The GRU sought to infiltrate a private company that provides software to election 
voting machines and registration databases.160 The goal was to gain intelligence on the 
databases’ software and hardware and obtain voters’ personal identification 
information.161 An investigation revealed it successfully hacked into a U.S. vendor’s 
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network.162 It then used the information obtained from the U.S. vendor to conduct a spear 
phishing attack on election administrative personnel in select counties in Florida.163 
While no evidence of votes being altered has been found, it is obvious from the 
Mueller Report that the Russians used the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as a test run for 
future elections and continues to be a threat to U.S. election security. The infiltration of 
voter registration databases, election websites, and campaign emails reveal to U.S. foreign 
adversaries the tools needed to influence a future U.S. election. Russia’s ability to infiltrate 
voting infrastructure highlighted the vulnerability of the U.S. voting infrastructure. The 
Obama administration recognized the area of vulnerability and began researching how to 
mitigate the threat and enhance security protocols. 
C. CREATION OF A CYBER AGENCY TO PROTECT THE U.S. 
ELECTION SYSTEM 
In an effort to protect U.S. democracy from foreign interference in the future U.S. 
elections, the Obama Administration designated election infrastructure as “critical 
infrastructure.”164 This designation led to many questions from state and local election 
officials regarding the federal government’s involvement and influence over election 
security.165 The responsibility for election infrastructure initially fell to the already 
established National Protection and Program Directorate. The Directorate created critical 
infrastructure security plans for those areas that had been identified as critical infrastructure 
by Homeland Security; to date, 16 critical infrastructure sub sectors.166 
One of the first steps the Directorate took was to create an election task force that 
involved federal, state and local election officials to improve information sharing involving 
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threats against election infrastructure.167 The Directorate initiated a Government 
Coordinating Council to focus on risk assessments, incident response, cybersecurity 
advising, and training resources for state and local election administrators.168 In February 
2018, the Directorate saw the need to create an additional council, the Subsector 
Coordinating Council, specifically to coordinate with private sector entities that provide 
election-related services for U.S. elections.169 The councils worked diligently to provide 
state and local officials with guidance on election security.170 The increase of foreign 
interference in 2016 caused legislators to replace the Directorate with an independent 
agency within DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, in 2018.171 
The Cyber Agency continued its collaboration with state and local election officials but 
emphasized the need for a more inclusive working relationship between the private and 
public sectors to combat and mitigate cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure.172 
The institution was met with challenges from the start.173 The role of Director 
remained vacant for months, lacked the necessary staffing levels, and failed to set 
performance metrics.174 While faced with limitations, the Cyber Agency focused on 
forging a stronger relationship with election stakeholders.175 This strengthening was done 
by creating two separate divisions within the agency.176 The Cybersecurity Division’s 
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responsibility was to ensure the integrity of the systems and networks and the Infrastructure 
Security Division took the lead on securing election facilities.177 This separation of duties 
allowed those divisions to liaison with their respective election stakeholders more 
efficiently. 
In 2018, the Cyber Agency began a new initiative of running tabletop exercises to 
prepare state and local officials for threats they may face in future elections.178 The 
exercises inspired some state and local election officials to begin conducting exercises of 
their own.179 The success of the 2018 “Tabletop the Vote” by this institution resulted in 
an additional exercise being executed in 2019.180 
A previous complaint from election shareholders was that the Cyber Agency failed 
to provide intelligence information on active threats.181 The Cyber Agency management 
recognized this challenge, and as a result, created the Election Infrastructure Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center to provide intelligence, technical, and operational support.182 
In an effort for transparency, the Analysis Center provides quarterly reports to state and 
local election officials.183 One of the Cyber Agency’s roadblocks is that state and local 
election officials do not possess the appropriate security clearance to receive the 
intelligence or the ability to access a secure facility to receive it effectively.184 For this 
reason, the Cyber Agency was forced to work with the cybersecurity industry to create a 
method in which they can share the information.185 
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An additional area of focus for the Cyber Agency has been providing technical and 
operational assistance to state and local election officials.186 While the Cyber Agency has 
been successful in advising numerous election officials on best practices for cybersecurity, 
not all state and local officials have been unable to take advantage of these services due to 
the lack of calendar space.187 The 2018 midterm election was an opportunity for the Cyber 
Agency and Homeland Security to evaluate the security plans and operations implemented 
since its inception. Prioritizing risks, providing special services, and intelligence sharing 
were areas the Cyber Agency needed to enhance.188 
The after-action report recommended internal changes for the Cyber Agency. The 
newly established agency lacked permanent leadership, direction, and resources necessary 
to complete tasks.189 Suppose an election official or frontline worker reaches out for 
assistance on Election Day. In that case, they lack the appropriate communication channels 
to receive notification of an incident and the response mechanisms necessary to rectify an 
issue in a timely manner.190 
While strides have been made, the Cyber Agency is running out of time to meet the 
goal of forging stronger stakeholder relationships and educating the public and election 
administrators. As of November 2019, they were still actively working on a strategic and 
operational plan for challenges facing U.S. elections.191 The lessons learned from the 2016 
election left officials focused on increasing the security of electronic voting infrastructure. 
U.S. adversaries took notice and began searching for additional ways to manipulate the 
system. 
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D. 2020 ELECTION 
Although lessons were learned from 2016, the 2020 election was not without its 
challenges. Ongoing disinformation campaigns from this nation’s foreign adversaries, 
attacks on mail-in voting, and a global pandemic, exposed new vulnerabilities within the 
U.S. election system.  
Foreign interference continued to be a threat to the U.S. election system in 2020. 
Russia, China, and Iran all had a stake in the Presidential election outcome and utilized 
social media as a weapon to create discord in the United States and cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the election.192 The Intelligence Community, federal agencies, and private 
industry worked closely together to combat the threat. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the Homeland Security Cyber Agency testified before the House of 
Representatives and Senate that foreign adversaries continued to manipulate American 
voters through social media and state-controlled news outlets.193 While Russia’s influence 
was not as prevalent as 2016, China and Iran saw the results of the 2016 influence and 
engaged in their own campaigns to disrupt or alter the 2020 elections in their favor. Russia 
actively targeted former Vice President Biden and his campaign to ensure President Trump 
was re-elected to office.194 The Russians continued to use social media and the internet to 
spread disinformation but turned to previous familiar tactics, such as using state-controlled 
news to influence U.S. elections.195 
China took a specific interest in influencing the outcome of the 2020 U.S. 
Presidential election. U.S. intelligence reports revealed the Chinese disapproved of the 
current administration’s hostile rhetoric against them, which led them to initiate their own 
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disinformation campaign within the United States to oust the current administration from 
office.196 In September 2020, Facebook identified and removed over 100 accounts with 
links to China.197 Many election security and intelligence experts believed China was 
simply utilizing social media to persuade Americans to see China in a more positive light 
rather than influencing the outcome of an election.198 The 2020 election would not be 
China’s first attempt at swaying an election in their favor. In 2019, China launched a series 
of social media and fake news campaigns against Taiwan’s current President.199 While 
China’s plan was unsuccessful, it revealed they were willing to engage in the use of 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to influence another country’s election.200 
Iran looked to capitalize on the 2016 U.S. Presidential election’s vulnerabilities to 
create distrust amongst voters.201 Tactics included engaging in voter intimidation and 
disinformation campaigns. The Intelligence Community reported the Iranian’s produced a 
bogus video highlighting the potential for mail-in voter fraud and a demonstration of how 
easily a voting machine could be hacked or ballots could be altered to lead to voter 
fraud.202 The Proud Boys logo, a right-wing Pro-Trump organization, was embedded in 
the video and distributed via social media platforms to legitimize the video.203 
U.S. foreign adversaries are not the only challenge to the spread of disinformation. 
The former Commander in Chief created a post early on November 4 on Twitter claiming 
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victory even though crucial swing states had not revealed a winner.204 This type of 
misinformation led to confusion and a lack of trust in election results. Twitter and Facebook 
immediately flagged the former President’s tweet.205 The former President and his 
supporters used social media platforms to cast doubt on mail-in voting’s validity 
throughout the campaign. The former President even went so far as to state he may not 
accept the election results due to the amount of fraud associated with mail-in ballots.206 
Election officials and experts would argue this is not the case and contributes to a 
minimal amount of voter fraud while giving more individuals the ability to vote.207 
Oregon, which has been voting by mail long before any other states, has only had 15 
attempted election fraud cases related to mail-in ballots over the last 20 years.208 Although 
very little fraud has been associated with mail-in voting in the past, the pandemic caused a 
mass influx of mail-in ballots. The massive amount of ballots led to instances in which 
mail couriers were charged with the delay or destruction of mail-in voting ballots. In 
Kentucky, a postal worker was charged with disposing of over 100 absentee ballots.209 In 
New Jersey, a postal worker was charged with discarding over 2,000 pieces of mail, which 
included 99 absentee ballots, in a dumpster instead of delivering it to residents in West 
Orange, New Jersey.210 
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Financial troubles, staffing constraints, and a voluminous amount of ballots led the 
Postal Service to fail to deliver ballots in the designated time to be counted. In fact, in the 
2020 primaries, approximately 65,000 mail-in or absentee ballots were not counted.211 In 
an effort to help voters meet deadlines, the Postal Service provided warnings to states about 
the possibility of delayed returns. The Postal Service also began taking shortcuts by 
sidestepping the final scanning process and delivering the ballots directly to the board of 
elections.212 The lack of traceability led voters and the public to believe 300,000 ballots 
were not counted.213  
As a result of timely delivery concerns, a federal judge ordered the Postal Service 
to conduct nightly sweeps of processing facilities in key swing states.214 In defiance, the 
Postal Service continued with its delivery plan, which resulted in 7% of absentee or mail-
in ballots not being counted in the 2020 election.215 Although the 7% would not have 
affected the election’s overall outcome, it demonstrated how important it is for election 
officials to work closely with the Postal Service to provide information to voters and put 
in place security mechanisms to track ballots. If lessons are not learned from the 2020 
election, the Postal Service may become a single point of failure for the election system. 
The 2020 election caused many Americans to question the integrity of the U.S. 
election system. Disinformation attacks from U.S. adversaries, the former President 
questioning the validity of mail-in voting, and the rapid implementation of mail-in voting 
contributed to these doubts. Election officials must begin to analyze how changes or 
vulnerabilities to one part of the system directly affect the entire system. Placing a patch 
on a leak may stop that particular leak but can also lead to additional leaks in another 
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section of the pipe. Perhaps a new, dynamic way of thinking is required. Applying systems 
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III. U.S. ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
The U.S. election system (Figure 2) is the sum of all parts used to run an election.216 
The U.S. founding fathers felt very strongly that voting was a states’ rights issue.217 The 
Articles of Confederation declared states should appoint delegates to represent the states 
in Congress and possessed the ability to remove them and replace them with new delegates 
if needed.218 The Constitution followed suit and led voting up to the states, and stipulated 
only white male landowners held the ability to vote.219 The states’ ability to set voting 
laws has led the U.S. Election System to become rather complicated. While the core 
foundation remains, amendments to the election system have presented new vulnerabilities 
to the original system created by the Framers. To ensure the U.S. election system’s integrity 
and resilience, an election official and legislators must understand what is encompassed in 
each stage and how altering one piece of the system could expose or create a vulnerability 
in the system. 
 
216 Alec Yasinsac and Matt Bishop, “The Dynamics of Counting and Recounting Votes,” IEEE 
Security & Privacy 6, no. 3 (2008): 22–29, https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2008.75. 
217 Brian L. Fife, Reforming the Electoral Process in America: Toward More Democracy in the 21st 
Century (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, Praeger, 2010), 31. 
218 U.S. Congress, United States Code, Articles of Confederation (1952). 
219 U.S. Const. art. I § 2. 
40 
 
Figure 2. The U.S. Electoral Process.
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A. PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES 
As political parties emerged over time, so did the method for nominating 
individuals for President (Figure 3). In the early to 1800s, when parties first appeared, 
Congressional leaders from each party nominated a candidate through a process known as 
King Caucus.225 The King Caucus process was superseded by nominating conventions in 
which each party nominated a candidate at respective conventions. The lack of involvement 
from the public led to accusations of fraud. This process did not settle well with the public, 
who sought greater input into the process. As a result, states began holding primaries to 
determine who the delegate representatives would be.226 As of today, primaries have 
become an integral part of the U.S. election system. 
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Figure 3. Primary and Caucus Flow Chart 
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Each state government sets the guidelines for how the primary elections should 
operate. The states have the option of holding an open or closed primary. In an open 
primary, party membership is not important.227 As a registered voter, people may vote for 
either the Republican or Democratic Party. However, in a closed primary, voters only have 
the ability to vote within their own party.228 While how someone votes can vary from state 
to state, all states afford all voters the ability to cast a vote via a secret ballot. Primaries are 
a true representation of the people, as they decide which candidate receives the majority of 
the state’s delegates. 
Instead of primaries, states have the option of holding caucuses. Caucuses are large 
community meetings where registered voters of a specific party gather to vote for the 
candidate and delegates who will represent them at the National Convention.229 Precinct 
caucuses are similar to a campaign rally; each candidate’s supporters are siphoned into 
groups, where those supporters do their best to sway voters to switch to their candidate. 
Rather than place individuals in groups, some states have opted to vote for someone’s 
candidate of choice via smart apps or paper. After a given amount of time, the number of 
individuals in a group is recorded to determine the number of delegates if any the candidate 
will receive.  
Democratic primaries require a candidate to have 15% or more of the number of 
attendees to receive delegates.230 If particular candidates are considered to be nonviable, 
their supporters will have an opportunity to join a viable candidate’s group before a final 
vote is taken. This process continues over and over again at the county level and 
congressional district level until the state convention, at which the final delegates for the 
national convention are chosen. Where Democrats rely solely on a proportional method for 
delegates, the Republican Party has allowed each state to choose between a winner-take-
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all mentality or the balanced approach.231 Due to limited participation by the public, and 
the time needed to participate in a caucus, the majority of states have opted to use primaries 
as the mechanism to determine the number of delegates and Presidential candidates. The 
Democratic Party uses a complicated mathematical formula to determine how many 
delegates and alternates each state can have, whereas Republican use a more simplistic 
method of winner take all.232 
As more states turned to the use of primaries, the party nominee was identified well 
before the National Convention. Instead of battling it out on the convention floor, the battle 
takes place at the polls. This power shift led to conventions becoming more a formality 
than a necessity. What was once considered the epicenter of democracy is now a media 
event to introduce the party nominee. 
B. NATIONAL CONVENTION  
The idea of National Conventions (Figure 4) started with the anti-Masonic Party in 
1831.233 Additional parties followed suit and held their own National Conventions to 
nominate their candidate for President. For over 100 years, the convention’s primary focus 
was to nominate a candidate to represent the party in the Presidential election and create 
the party’s platform. In recent years, this process has become more of a formality, as the 
nominee secures the necessary number of delegates prior to the convention. 
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Figure 4. National Conventions Flow Chart. 
In the early years of the United States, a formal democratic process did not decide the 
party nominee; instead, a select group of individuals decided it for the party.234 As the country 
grew, so did the need for a formal process resulting in party leaders holding conventions. The 
idea was to have a place where party leaders from all over the country could come together to 
discuss issues and determine their platforms.235 Current challenges facing the new nation led 
 




to combative conventions.236 To alleviate such battles, the parties began establishing policy 
and procedures, such as a Democratic Presidential candidate could not be designated the 
nominee until said nominee obtained two-thirds majority of the delegate votes.237 As new 
issues arose, the policies were evaluated and adjusted to improve the nomination process. 
One of those issues was the advancement of technology, the increase of the media’s 
coverage of conventions left party leaders concerned over the appearance of brokered and 
contested conventions. Specifically, pictures of protestors clashing with police tainted the 
image of the 1968 Democratic National Convention.238 To improve the National 
Convention’s optics, the Democratic Party began to explore the use of primaries to identify 
the party nominee.239  
Imagine watching a National Convention where delegates had to vote over 100 times 
before finally declaring a candidate the nominee. While this scenario may seem far-fetched 
today, it happened at the 1924 Democratic Convention. Delegates were unable to garner 
enough votes for a nominee, which left the party elites to convince delegates to go with a 
specific candidate.240 Although brokered conventions are rare in today’s environment, the 
United States has come close to experiencing a contested convention.  
The large candidate pool, intra-party division, and social media use to influence voters 
left both parties leading up to the 2016 Presidential election without a clear candidate and 
fearful of a contested convention.241 Although the 2016 conventions were uncontested, it 
highlighted the role social media played in the primaries and conventions. Social media’s 
power was slowly dismantling the power of the party establishment and sending this nation 
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C. ELECTION DAY 
This country’s founding fathers did not see a need to have Presidential elections on a 
specific day. Giving states the ability to hold elections on their day of choosing in November 
or early December also allowed voters in other states to change their minds. Congress 
recognized this challenge and passed a federal law in the mid-1800s declaring the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in November as Election Day.243 While the day itself has not changed, 
over time, states have implemented early voting, mail-in voting, and absentee voting as a way 
to increase voter turnout.  
Early elections saw Americans vote by shouting out their vote in a public place. This 
method of voting did not last long, and by the 1800s, Americans were voting via paper ballot. 
As technology advanced, so did voting mechanisms. Over the last two centuries, voters have 
utilized mechanical lever machines, punch-card machines, and computerized machines. When 
voters go to the polls today, a volunteer poll worker will verify they are a registered voter via 
a pollbook. If a voter’s registration is unable to be verified, a provisional ballot will be offered 
to the voter.244 Provisional ballots were created under the Voter Act to provide an opportunity 
for individuals still to vote if their registration was called into question. The provisional ballot 
will not be counted until the voter’s registration information is validated to prevent fraud.  
If registration is verified, the voter will be directed to a voting machine. The current 
voting machines utilized in the United States are hand-marked optical scan, ballot marking 
device, and direct-recording electronic voting machines. Although the increased use of 
electronic voting machines helped rectify the past problems, it brought with it new security 
challenges. 
Some election infrastructure experts argue electronic voting machines will always be 
susceptible to hackers and it is not possible to 100% secure the equipment itself.245 Experts 
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maintain that a solution to this problem is for all voting machines used in the United States to 
possess the capability to print a paper ballot.246 The paper ballot acts as a secondary backup 
to the voting machine and would be used to conduct an audit to ensure the validity of the 
count.247 
Some experts would argue that having a decentralized way of voting works in the 
United States’ favor.248 Hackers would have to be knowledgeable about various voting 
machines to have maximum disruption.249 Attacking just one type of device would have 
minimal impact on an election’s outcome.250 Although the U.S. voting system’s current 
decentralization makes it challenging for hackers, it does not make it impossible. Other election 
experts argue having a decentralized system makes it difficult for election security experts to 
implement universal protocols and detect potential threats to the U.S. election 
infrastructure.251  
An additional challenge for election officials is the vendors who supply the hardware 
and software for the voting equipment.252 The supply-chain continues to come from third 
parties, often foreign countries that have an interest in the outcome of U.S. elections.253 A 
small number of vendors have a monopoly over voting equipment, which makes it difficult for 
county and state election officials to find alternative options and the vendors offer little 
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Depending on the voting mechanism used will depend on how the vote is counted. 
Suppose a paper ballot is printed from the voting machine. In that case, the votes are scanned 
via an optical scanner and uploaded to a central location or stored on a memory device securely 
transported to a central tallying location. Even though Election Day has been the primary way 
Americans have voted, states recognized the need to have alternatives for those who cannot be 
present on Election Day. 
What started as a way for Civil War soldiers to vote during the war has morphed into 
states creating absentee ballots laws for those with disabilities, serving in the U.S. military, and 
business obligations on Election Day.255 As a response to these challenges, more than half of 
the 50 states have implemented no-excuse absentee voting. Various forms of absentee voting 
are available, such as excuse required, no-excuse, permanent absentee, all vote-by mail, the 
Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.256 Each state is responsible for 
implementing laws regarding the type of absentee voting, timelines, and security procedures 
regarding absentee voting.257 Over the years, five states began casting ballots solely through 
universal mail-in voting successfully for years.258 The recent global pandemic forced states to 
permit voters to request absentee ballots or vote by mail citing the pandemic as an excuse, 
which created an impossible task for election officials.259  
When returning the ballot, it must contain a signature on the outside of one of the 
envelopes. The voter then can return it via mail, ballot drop boxes, or election offices. States 
have implemented various security procedures, such as sending ballots to tracking 
mechanisms, secured in multiple envelopes, address mechanisms, registration verification, and 
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signature verification process.260 Critics would argue this method could lead to delayed or 
never received ballots, misprinted ballots, confusion with ballots, voter coercion, or voter fraud 
via family members.261  
An additional option now being offered to voters is in-person early voting. Voting 
locations are pre-selected by election officials. Each state will determine when early voting 
will begin. Texas, for example allows early voting up to 21 days prior to the election.262 As a 
result of relaxed mail-in voting and absentee ballots laws, a few states began allowing voters 
to use these types of voting mechanisms to vote early. The recent 2020 election saw a record 
number of voters participate in early voting.263 As early voting and mail-in voting becomes 
more popular, states have begun to favor vote centers instead of precinct locations. This 
popularity has resulted in precinct locations being closed and frustrated voters waiting in long 
line. Election officials must notify the public of changes and updates to the location of poll 
locations or vote centers. Election administrators continue to study and evaluate polling 
locations to serve the public on Election Day best (Figure 5).264 
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Figure 5. General Election Voting Flow Chart. 
Although providing voters with additional mechanisms increases voters’ 
convenience, it has caused challenges for the U.S. voting system. Electronic voting 
machines are costly, require training for poll workers, and are vulnerable to an attack from 
bad actors. Increased mail-in and absentee voting has placed an enormous amount of strain 
on the Postal Service and election officials to obtain the necessary personnel needed, secure 
the ballots, and ensure chain of custody protocols are established and followed. 
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D. CERTIFYING ELECTIONS 
Polls have closed, and the nation anxiously awaits the results, but the job continues 
as all votes are tallied for election administrators. What Americans see reported by the 
media late into the night are unofficial results. The detailed process of counting may take 
one day, five days, or several weeks depending on individual state laws (Figure 6). States 
must process early voting, provisional ballots, mail-in and absentee ballots, and ballots 
stored on a media device. The recent global pandemic has caused states to amend laws to 
account for the voluminous amount of mail-in voting in the 2020 election. 
 
Figure 6. Certifying Elections Flow Chart 
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The goal of canvas boards is to ensure that every ballot cast is accurately 
represented in the final count and includes ballots that were called into question, such as 
mismatched signatures, damaged ballots, or voter intent.265 Canvas boards are composed 
of the state’s chief election official, judges, or state officials. For transparency purposes, 
observers are allowed to witness counting procedures but must follow election officials’ 
guidelines. Some jurisdictions will even go so far as to live-stream the canvas to provide 
transparency.266 To prevent fraud claims, a detailed report will be conducted and submitted 
by election officials and a final canvas meeting will be held to certify the results.267 While 
most canvases end with a clear winner, this is not always the case. 
In some instances, a canvas will reveal the race is too close to call. In many states, 
if the total count falls within a half percent of another, an automatic recount will be 
generated.268 Recounts are conducted under specific guidelines established by the states, 
including timeframes, staffing and training requirements, and type of recount. Election 
officials should work with local law enforcement or private security firms to establish 
security protocols. These policies and procedures are detailed for members of the recount 
board, observers, and the media. While each state is different, recount boards are made up 
of bi-partisan members to help maintain the recount’s integrity. Once they arrive, each 
member of the recount team will be assigned an area of responsibility and observers will 
be led to their designated area.269 Depending on each state law, a recount may be 
conducted by hand or through an optical scanner. Tally sheets, batch sheets, and ballots are 
kept for each type of voting mechanisms and are added together to reveal the results of the 
recount. The more transparent a recount can be, the less likely it will be used as a vehicle 
for a disinformation campaign. 
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Even if the general election does not generate an automatic recount, a candidate can 
contest the election. Each state sets guidelines for when a candidate can contest an election, 
which must be done within a specific time period and may require the candidate to pick up 
the tab.270 In the 2020 election, the small percentage of victory in Wisconsin by Biden led 
the Trump campaign to request a recount in two Wisconsin counties and cited voter fraud 
as the reason.271 Although the Trump campaign was unable to produce evidence of fraud, 
the campaign was willing to spend $3 million to identify potential fraud.272 The recount 
debunked the fraud claims and certified Biden as the winner.  
The 2020 election highlighted states’ abilities to conduct audits without being 
requested or mandatory. States use audits to measure the resilience of the election system 
in place. Traditional or risk limiting audits are the primary methods utilized to conduct 
audits. A traditional audit fails to distinguish between a close election and a large victory 
margin by creating a preset percentage of districts to recount.273 Paper ballots are hand-
counted and compared to the results of the electronic voting machines. Whereas in risk-
limiting audits, the margin of victory determines how many votes are counted. Researchers 
argue it is not necessary to count every vote and that using statistical methods to analyze 
fewer votes allows election officials to determine the accuracy of the tally.274  
To debunk claims of voter fraud involving Dominion voting machines, the Georgia 
Secretary of State ordered a risk-limiting audit of the paper ballots produced by election 
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machines.275 An Election Commission certified company would oversee the testing of the 
touchscreen machines and tabulation scanners.276 For complete transparency, the 
Secretary of State required all votes cast be manually counted.277 During the audit, a few 
counties identified errors, such as memory cards not being uploaded for counting. These 
errors were rectified and the results were re-certified for those counties. In the end, the 
audit confirmed Biden did indeed win Georgia and the allegations against the voting 
machines in Georgia were false.278 President Trump continued to use social media to 
express his doubt over the audit results, which resulted in the President’s lawyers 
requesting a formal recount in Georgia.279 Georgia law requires recounts to be completed 
via optical scanners.280 In the end, the third recount once again verified Biden won the 
state, which led the Secretary of State to certify the results on December 7, 2020.281 
Post-election audits provide states the ability to validate the state’s current election 
system. Audits identify errors made during the general election, correct them, and prevent 
them from happening in a future election. The 2020 election represented how social media 
use can be used to sow doubt in the validity of the U.S. election system. The use of post-
election offers a solution to mitigating the spread of misinformation. The audits provide 
the public with the transparency needed to discredit attacks on the legitimacy of an election. 
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E. ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
When creating the U.S. Constitution, the Framers recognized the need to outline 
the process for choosing the President of the United States. The challenge became that the 
framers struggled to agree on the process. The founders considered all options but 
ultimately compromised on each state’s idea holding a number of electoral votes in 
proportion to the number of Senators and House members.282 However, the framers did 
place stipulations on who could serve as an elector; members of the Congress or Senate 
were forbidden, as was an individual who held an office of trust.283 In true federalist form, 
how electors were chosen was left up to each state. Once selected by state legislatures, 
electors met in their home states and cast a ballot for two individuals with the caveat that 
they are prohibited from voting for a candidate from their home state.284 The votes are 
listed, certified and sealed, and sent securely to the President of the Senate (Figure 7).285 
The individual with the highest number of electoral votes was named President and the 
runner-up became the Vice President. If the electoral vote resulted in a tie, then the House 
of Representatives would each cast a vote per state delegation to determine who is 
President.  
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Figure 7. Electoral College Flow Chart 
The election of 1800 identified vulnerabilities to the electoral system structure. The 
introduction of party line voting led to Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr receiving the 
same number of votes to Congress. After 36 tries and backroom negotiations, the House 
elected Thomas Jefferson President of the United States. To prevent this predicament from 
happening again, Congress enacted an amendment to the Constitution.286 Due to the 
Electoral College provision, the President and Vice President were listed on separate 
ballots and the list of candidates presented to the House in a contested electoral vote shrunk 
from five to three.287 Over the years, states have ratified laws to enable the public to choose 
the electors to represent their respective state. Today, in all but two states, the winner of 
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the statewide election receives all the electoral votes.288 In December, on the first Monday 
after the second Wednesday, electors gather as mandated by state law and cast their ballots 
for the President. The results are sealed, certified, and sent by the Governor of the State to 
the President of the Senate, Secretary of State Office, Archivists of the United States, and 
a federal judge in the states district.289 This complex process has led many critics of the 
Electoral College to question if reform is needed. 
Critics of the Electoral College feel as though the popular vote should declare the 
winner of the election and not the Electoral College.290 In the history of the United States, 
only five instances have occurred in which the candidate who won the popular vote did not 
win the Electoral College.291 One of those instances was in 2016; Presidential Candidate 
Hillary Clinton was the victor of the popular vote by more than two million votes but failed 
to obtain the necessary 270 electoral votes.292 Meanwhile, Presidential Candidate Trump 
acquired 304 electoral votes that resulted in him being certified as the next President.293 
The 2016 election reignited the debate on whether the Electoral College is archaic and 
undemocratic and should be modified to reflect the people’s will, not a chosen few.  
F. JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS CERTIFICATION 
The final phase of the U.S. election system is the ratification by the House and the 
Senate of the Electoral College votes. The 12th amendment of the Constitution requires the 
House and the Senate to convene in a joint session on January 6 when the Vice President 
will open the states certified results in alphabetical order (Figure 8).294 The process 
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stipulates the Vice President will then hand each state’s vote to the tellers, who are 
preselected by members of the House and Senate, to announce the vote verbally. After each 
state’s vote is read aloud, lawmakers will have the opportunity to provide an objection to 
the vote in writing. A member of each chamber must support the objection.295 The 
objection will lead to a breakout session for each chamber, during which they will discuss 
the merits of the objection and then vote to uphold the electoral vote or overturn it. 
Rejecting a state’s vote would require a simple majority by both chambers, which is only 
likely to happen when a party occupies both the House and the Senate. After two hours, 
the chambers reconvene and announce their decision; if the vote fails to reject the state’s 
electoral vote, the teller counts the vote and moves on to the next state. If both chambers 
were able to agree to overturn the vote, the state’s governor becomes the decision 
maker.296  
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Figure 8. Joint Sessions of Congress Flow Chart 
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Despite what many Americans may think, the Constitution does not give the Vice 
President the power to overturn electoral votes.297 The Vice President merely presides over 
the session to preserve the validity of the process. Once all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia certified results have been read and counted, the Vice President will announce 
if a candidate has reached the required votes necessary to obtain the presidency’s office. 
This announcement serves as the final verification of who has been certified as the next 
President of the United States.  
If either candidate fails to reach the necessary 270 electoral votes, then the House 
votes on the Presidency, and the Senate votes on the Vice President.298 Legislatures from 
each state must put forth one vote from their state; the process does not allow each 
individual to cast a ballot (Figure 9).299 The 2020 election saw the former President and 
his supporters call for lawmakers to challenge the certified electoral votes on January 6 in 
crucial swing states by citing voter fraud as the reason. On January 6, several Republicans 
did indeed provide a written challenge to the electoral votes in Arizona and 
Pennsylvania.300 After deliberations and chamber votes, Republicans failed to secure the 
necessary votes needed to overturn the electoral votes, and Biden was declared the 
President of the United States. 
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Figure 9. The U.S. Electoral Process Flow Chart
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Prior to objections, the nation saw Trump supporters and right-wing activists storm 
the Capitol in an attempt to disrupt or delay the electoral count. The rioting and destruction of 
federal property resulted in lawmakers being evacuated from the House floor to a secure 
location. In a sign of unity, lawmakers recognized the need to preserve the process and 
continue with the joint session. While rioters were successful in disrupting the process, they 
could not destroy the democratic process.  
The Capitol’s attack revealed election officials, legislatures, and government agencies 
must acknowledge foreign adversaries are not the only groups attempting to attack the U.S. 
election system but domestic groups as well. What happened at the Capitol exposed not only 
a security vulnerability but also the ability to halt the process. 
Had law enforcement not been able to rectify the security situation so quickly, 
lawmakers would not have been able to reconvene and finish the count.  
This situation is not the only vulnerability within the Joint Session. The current system 
in place poses challenges in today’s partisan environment. Allowing only one vote per state 
delegation could give a candidate an unfair advantage in securing the Presidency. For 
example, although the Democrats controlled the house on January 6, some states had a 
Republican majority. Under the current 12th amendment, a state could have voted for Trump 
over Biden and pave the way for a Trump victory even though Biden won the popular vote 
and controlled the House.301  
Due to the times, the founding fathers saw the need for a decentralized U.S. electoral 
system. Still, as the country expanded and became more democratic, the system became even 
more complex. What was once the decision of a select few now consists of involvement by 
state election officials and legislatures, oversight by federal agencies and legislation, third-
party vendors, advanced technology, and widespread mail-in and absentee voting. As these 
changes were made, election administrators and legislatures failed to recognize each change’s 
effect on other components within the election system. Applying systems thinking and red 
teaming to the idea will assist in determining if this potential change is a viable solution.  
 
301 U. S. Const. amend. XII (1804). 
64 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
65 
IV. APPLYING SYSTEMS THINKING AND RED TEAMING TO 
THE U.S. ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
While systems thinking and red teaming could be applied to each component within 
the U.S. electoral system, this thesis explores how the rapid implementation of widespread 
mail-in voting in the 2020 election affected various components within the system. As a 
result of the recent pandemic, election officials and legislatures were forced to find a way 
to conduct primaries and a general election still while maintaining the safety of the public. 
This situation resulted in states expanding legitimate reasons to include COVID, with some 
states excluding a signature-matching requirement, and extending the return deadline date.  
Prior to the 2020 pandemic, only five states utilized universal voting, which left the 
majority of election administrators unprepared to handle the vast amount of mail-in 
ballots.302 Election administrators needed to ensure that security protocols for processing 
ballots were in place, efficient numbers of personnel and training were provided, obtaining 
the necessary equipment to count, increasing the number of ballot drop boxes, and 
coordinating with the Postal Service. Numerous critics, including President Trump, 
believed this voting method would lead to large amounts of voter fraud.303 President 
Trump and his supporters continued to use social media in an effort to create doubt about 
mail-in voting and the election results. A decentralized electoral system combined with a 
global pandemic and negative rhetoric by high-ranking government officials made the 
process of mail-in voting challenging for election officials. Although the 2020 election did 
not see an increase in voter fraud, the mass influx of mail-in ballots did expose vulnerability 
points and adversely affected various components of the election system. 
A. CHAIN OF CUSTODY PROCEDURES FOR MAIL-IN BALLOTS 
A key component to preserving the integrity of voting via mail is the security and 
chain of custody protocols created by election officials. Oregon, which has been voting by 
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mail long before any other states, has only identified 15 attempted election fraud cases 
related to mail-in ballots over the last 20 years.304 Part of Oregon’s success can be 
attributed to the chain of custody protocols established by election officials. Oregon has 
spent years perfecting security protocols to ensure a ballot is tracked from inception until 
the time it is counted.305 
1. Voter Registration and Distribution of Universal Mail-In Ballots 
After years of wasting time and money on ballots for voters who have moved or 
were no longer viable registered voters, Oregon passed legislation for automatic voter 
registration.306 Since an individual is already required to provide the Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) with identification documents, Oregon legislators leveraged this 
collection of documents to register someone to vote. Since the individual is not presented 
with a choice at the DMV, Oregon does provide an opportunity for an individual to opt-
out by returning a postcard provided by the state to be unregistered. If the card arrives 
within the specified time period, the individual will be removed from the voter roll. The 
voter registration database is the primary source for all voter registration information, 
including name, address, and proof of life. In an effort to maintain accurate records, 
election officials rely on receiving updated voter roll information from the DMV.  
While the law has led to an increase in Oregon’s voter registration, it has also 
exposed a new vulnerability point within the election system. The Cyber Agency offers 
states the opportunity to have their election machines, websites, and databases analyzed for 
potential breaches, but the DMV database falls outside the agency’s scope of responsibility. 
If election officials receive voter information through the DMV, altering specific 
individuals’ information could result in voters not receiving a ballot. The Oregon DMV 
website is also connected to the internet, which makes it visible to hackers and vulnerable 
to an attack. The Cyber Agency’s assessment would not reveal a breach since it occurred 
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on the DMV database. A hacker only has to change a small number of addresses for the 
public to begin to doubt the process of mail-in voting.  
Election officials in Oregon determined mailing ballots three weeks ahead of 
elections would provide a sufficient amount of time for voters to cast and return a ballot.307 
While maybe enough time to identify a mailing error and request a new ballot, some states 
allow individuals to request ballots up to six days before the election, and as such, a new 
ballot would never reach them in time. A state like Oregon that has been executing 
universal mail-in voting for over 20 years has experienced these hardships, learned from 
them, and rectified the problem. States new to mail-in voting as a result of the pandemic 
failed to recognize the impact of incorrect voter rolls and requests so close to the election 
could have on ballots being returned on time. This oversight could lead to voters’ ballots 
not being returned in time to be counted. In a state where the election is anticipated to be 
close, this lapse in policy change could alter election results or cause voters to become 
disenfranchised with the process.  
For example, a red teaming exercise could include a political activist acting as a 
volunteer to assist in the preparation of mail-in ballots. The activist would have access to 
the voter registration information and can identify liberal voters by zip code. The activist 
can easily find this information through an open-source search on the internet. For example, 
Dekalb County in Georgia has 79.1% of voters who lean Democratic.308 By removing 
thousands of ballots, it is easily possible to stand an 80% chance of discarding Democratic 
ballots. In the case of universal mail-in voting, ballots do not have to be requested; thus, 
the activist would have the ability to forgo sending a large number of ballots to that 
particular zip code intentionally.  
2. Casting Mail-In Ballots  
The 2020 U.S. general election forced election officials to relax or alter election 
laws for mail-in voting, such as deadline dates for ballots to be counted. Many of the 
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changes to election laws were challenged by both parties and resulted in decisions being 
made by the state supreme courts. The legal challenges, combined with many first-time 
voters’ anticipation, led election officials to provide guidance on election websites as to 
how to complete and return a ballot.  
In most states, when a voter receives a ballot, included inside the package are two 
envelopes, a return envelope with a barcode for tracking purposes, and a privacy envelope 
for the ballot itself.309 While most states require the voter to sign the return envelope as a 
form of proof of identity, a few states require a notary or witness to sign the ballot as an 
extra step of voter identification.310 State election officials are constantly trying to strike a 
balance between convenience for the voter while maintaining the integrity of the system. 
As a result of the pandemic, states waived or altered the requirement to prevent the spread 
of COVID-19. For example, North Carolina’s state chose to require one witness instead of 
the standard two for the 2020 election.311  
The pandemic has altered the manner in which mail-in voting and absentee voting 
operates. North Carolina recognized how important it is still to require security protocols 
for voter identification due to its association with the most notable absentee voter fraud 
case in recent history.312 In 2018, an individual working for a House Representative 
Republican Candidate in North Carolina was indicted along with co-conspirators for 
attempting to defraud the state with fraudulently obtained absentee ballots.313 
The indictment alleges these individuals hired his co-conspirators to collect 
absentee ballots from voters and lie about witnessing their votes.314 Once the absentee 
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ballots were in his possession, he then mailed the ballots to give the appearance they were 
mailed by the voter.315 These tainted ballots were then counted in the 2018 election, which 
gave the Republican candidate a 900-vote advantage over his opponent.316 
Selling ballots is always a risk when it comes to mail-in voting. Although the act 
of buying or selling votes is illegal in the United States, it does not stop individuals from 
trying to earn a quick buck or attempting to influence an election. The challenge with mail-
in voting is the lack of oversight over the casting of a ballot, and just security protocols in 
place to verify a voter’s identity at a counting facility. However, this verification process 
fails to identify individuals willingly signing the envelope but handing over a blank ballot 
to an interest group or community organizers from the comfort of their own home. 
Voters, interest groups, and bad actors utilize e-commerce markets to buy and sell 
ballots. Before being turned in by a concerned citizen, a Minnesota man attempted to sell 
his vote on eBay for the 2008 U.S. Presidential election.317 The individual was charged, 
and no one placed a bid on his ballot auction. An individual in upstate New York took the 
idea of selling votes to a whole new level when he created a website called 
voteauction.com.318 This website sought out individuals who had no interest in voting in 
elections and auctioned them off in bulk per each state. The auction house then acted as a 
broker between the voter and the individual or special interest groups advising the voter to 
choose a particular candidate.319 The auction house then verified the voter did indeed vote 
for that candidate; the voter then returned the ballot via mail and received payment.320 The 
website was sold and several states obtained court-ordered restraining orders against the 
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site.321 While these sites do not exist anymore, the dark web would be a perfect 
environment for this type of activity to thrive on. 
While cases like the one in North Carolina are rare, the 2020 U.S. Presidential 
election did see an influx of absentee ballots due to the pandemic. This influx presents a 
challenge for election officials to ensure all those who requested an absentee ballot receive 
them, properly execute them, and return them in a timely manner. The combination of a 
lack of clarity on the voter’s part and the logistical and staffing challenge on election 
administrators leads to public and campaign questions. 
Once again, providing the information on election websites will help alleviate 
confusion among voters.  
Using county or state election websites to display instructions for voters exposes 
county election websites to foreign adversaries and bad actors. Leading up to the 2020 
general election, the Cyber Agency and FBI warned the public and election officials of the 
potential for Iranian actors to infiltrate election infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the 
election.322 The advisory specifically warned of election website defacements, where a 
bad actor can access website content and alter the data to fit their narrative.323 In an 
election year where arming the public with as much knowledge as possible about the 
election process was important, casting doubt on the validity of the county website’s 
information would lead to voter suppression.  
Third-party software vendors are still a challenge for the Cyber Agency and 
election officials. Hackers recently were successful in committing a cybersecurity attack 
on a large IT firm, SolarWinds, in the United States that provides software to over 33,000 
government agencies and private entities.324 The large IT firm unknowingly introduced 
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malware to its customers through a software update they pushed out that allowed hackers 
to access the customer’s technology systems once installed.325 The malicious code went 
undetected for over nine months and was finally identified by a private entity cybersecurity 
team, not the federal government.  
A red team could run an operation in which they purchase swing state voter 
registration information off the dark web. It is estimated that 20 U.S. states’ voter 
registration information, including name, address, party affiliation, and addresses, was 
located and listed for sale on the dark web in 2018.326 Low-income areas can be identified 
using open-source tools, such as the county’s website. The red team can obtain party 
affiliation information along with the address and provide it to special interest groups to be 
used to purchase votes. These special interest groups often hold the purse strings for these 
types of grassroots operations, and have, for years, organized social functions, free dinners, 
and bus rides to the polls. The special interest group would then have local representatives 
go door-to-door at lower-income voters’ homes and offer to purchase their ballot for a 
certain amount of money. The voter would complete the ballot, sign the outer envelope, 
and hand it to the individual representing the interest group. The representative will return 
the ballots via mail or ballot dropbox with election officials none the wiser.  
B. RETURNING MAIL-IN BALLOTS 
Once a ballot has been cast, a voter has the option of returning the ballot via mail, 
dropbox, or to an election office by 8 pm on Election Day. Some states will accept ballots 
ranging from three to 14 days after the election assuming the ballots were postmarked by 
Election Day. A recent Pew Research survey conducted revealed that returning ballots via 
mail was still the preferred method but only slightly ahead of ballot drop boxes for voters 
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in the 2020 election.327 In anticipation of a rise in mail-in or absentee ballots and relief for 
the Postal Office, election officials increased the number of ballot drop boxes.  
1. Ballot Drop Boxes 
States who use universal mail-in voting have relied on ballot drop boxes as an 
alternative method for returning ballots by mail for years. The use of drop boxes varies 
from state to state depending on election laws or policies and procedures set in place by 
state or county election officials. Two types of drop boxes are used by states, indoor boxes 
monitored by election officials and outdoor unattended boxes near government or election 
offices. While drop boxes are not new to election security, the number of states that have 
experience with this process is slim. In the 2016 election, less than 20% of voters returned 
their ballots via drop boxes.328 As a result of a warning to states issued by the Postal 
Service regarding the potential for ballots to be returned after the election, additional states 
implemented the use of ballot drop boxes as an alternative to return ballots. 
With its new popularity comes many questions about its security and the process. 
For those states inexperienced with drop boxes, the challenge became purchasing drop 
boxes, identifying the necessary locations, and establishing security protocols in a short 
period of time.329 Such challenges led some states to opt to forgo the use of ballot drop 
boxes over concerns of voter suppression or voter fraud.330 Even election officials in states 
with extensive experience with ballot drop boxes raised concerns over election officials in 
inexperienced states not having sufficient time to implement security protocols, such as 
security cameras and pick up procedures.  
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Manufacturers advise it takes up to six months to create a custom drop box and 
approximately two months for installation.331 Election officials must also consider the cost 
of the drop boxes, which is on average $6,000.332 With many county election officials 
operating off limited budgets, states would need to look for assistance from the federal 
government to obtain the necessary funds. Manufacturers of the drop boxes argue the ballot 
boxes are impenetrable and can even withstand a car crashing into them.333 Security 
protocols, such as placing security cameras on the box, bolting them to the ground, and 
built using steel have been put in place to mitigate an attack.334  
The security of a drop box itself is not the only concern for election officials. 
Security protocols for how the ballots are retrieved and returned must be established to 
ensure safe delivery to election facilities. For example, in Washington State, county 
election officials have implemented security protocols, such as requiring a two-person pick 
up, logbooks, evidence seals with serial numbers, and global positioning system trackers 
to ensure the successful delivery of all ballots.335 Establishing security protocols is similar 
to how law enforcement handles evidence in a criminal case. The mishandling of evidence 
could result in a case being dropped against the defendant or an individual being acquitted 
at trial. For this reason, law enforcement agencies have detailed security protocols in place 
when handling evidence. For election officials, security protocols are just as important, as 
the mishandling of ballots may possibly result in a voter’s ballot not being counted in an 
election. The challenge becomes, will states with less experience have enough time to 
implement the necessary security protocol to ensure a fair election? 
Although most election officials have a strong security plan, it does not leave them 
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with over 120 ballots inside.336 Once the fire was extinguished, it was determined a small 
number of ballots were unreadable or uncountable.337 A second fire was reported in 
California in late October where approximately 100 ballots were found damaged.338 
Despite the fact neither one of these cases adversely affected the outcome of the election, 
it damages the election system’s integrity. 
In an effort to increase security protocols for ballot drop boxes, red teaming 
exercises should be conducted against ballot drop boxes around the country to determine 
how feasible it would be for someone to penetrate or destroy a ballot drop box. The 
scenarios should cover both attended and unattended ballot drop boxes, an insider and 
outsider attack, and drop boxes for which administrative controls are in place and for boxes 
that do not them in place.  
2. United States Postal Service 
Since the Civil War, the United States Postal Service has been successfully 
delivering ballots as a result of mail-in voting and absentee ballots.339 Abraham Lincoln 
wanted to give soldiers the ability to cast a vote from the battlefield.340 Up until the 2020 
Presidential election, neither voters, election officials, nor government officials have aired 
significant complaints about mail-in voting or the Postal Service’s ability to return ballots 
in a timely manner. In 2014, only 3% of voters expressed doubt in the Postal Service’s 
ability.341  
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Over recent years, the Postal Service has experienced financial troubles due to the 
rise in competitors, lack of sales, and the passage of legislation requiring retirement be paid 
up front.342 To alleviate the economic problems, the current Postmaster General eliminated 
many sorting machines, authorized the removal of collection boxes, and cut overtime for 
employees.343 Critics of these changes argue the recent changes are well beyond past cost-
saving operations and more likely the result of President Trump’s goal of eliminating 
universal mail-in voting in the 2020 election.344 This argument was reinforced when 
President Trump acknowledged he opposed the signing of a pandemic relief bill that 
included funding for the Postal Service to perform its duties, including collecting mail-in 
ballots.345 Although President Trump did ultimately sign the relief bill, he continued to 
make unfounded accusations against mail-in voting.346 
Critics of the Postmaster General saw his changes as a move to enhance the current 
administration’s claim mail-in voting would result in voter fraud.347 It is no secret the 
Postmaster General has contributed to former President Trump’s re-election campaign 
prior to being appointed Postmaster General.348 The uproar resulted in the Postmaster 
General agreeing to forego any additional changes until after the 2020 general election.349 
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Before the Senate, the Postmaster General testified the Postal Service could deliver ballots 
“securely and on time,” calling it a “sacred duty.”350 
These divisive decisions combined with staffing constraints due to the pandemic 
have led to individuals seeing delayed delivery of necessities, such as prescriptions and 
benefits, and raising concerns amongst legislators and government officials about the 
Postal Service’s ability to deliver ballots on time.351 Recent warnings to states about the 
possibility of delayed returns, combined with the fact that approximately 65,000 mail-in or 
absentee ballots were not counted in the recent primaries, did little to improve the Postal 
Service’s reputation with voters and election officials.352 
The previous administration’s comments on mail-in voting, the recent changes to 
the Postal Service, and the rise in absentee ballot requests have caused voters to question 
the Postal Service’s ability to deliver their ballots on time or even at all. Prior to the 2020 
primaries in Michigan, the Secretary of State released a statement to Michigan voters 
encouraging them to forgo the use of the postal service and return their ballots via drop box 
to ensure the ballot is counted.353 
Ultimately, the 2020 election exposed shortcuts taken by the Postal Service’s ability 
to return ballots in a timely manner.354 The increase in the number of ballots forced the 
Postal Service to sidestep the final scanning process and deliver directly to the board of 
elections.355 The lack of scanning led voters and the public to believe 150,000 ballots were 
not counted, and in response, the Postal Service came out and publicly debunked the 
claim.356  
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The exposure of skipped protocols was not the only bad press the Postal Service 
received. As a result of the concerns of timely deliveries, a federal judge ordered the Postal 
Service to conduct nightly sweeps of processing facilities in crucial swing states.357 In 
defiance, the Postal Service stayed its course, which resulted in 7% of absentee or mail-in 
ballots not being counted in the 2020 election.358  
The 7% would not affect the overall outcome of the election, but it demonstrates 
how important it is for election officials to work closely with the Postal Service to provide 
information to voters and put security mechanisms in place to track ballots.359 The rapidly 
increased implementation of mail-in voting highlighted deficiencies within the Postal 
Service not noticed before that led election officials and the public to doubt the Postal 
Service and the results of the election. If lessons are not learned from the 2020 election, 
the Postal Service could become a single point of failure for the election system. 
When considering red team attacks against the Postal Service, a direct physical 
attack might prove sufficient. The processing centers that collect mail-in ballots generally 
lack complex security that other government buildings have, such as federal courthouses. 
The Office of Inspector General reports, readily available online for public viewing, often 
note non-working gates, inoperable cameras, and broken or unlocked doors.360 This 
information can be used to plan a coordinated breach on a processing center. Targeting a 
postal processing center in a major city, on a Saturday evening, after hours, could make it 
easy for red team members to have access to collected ballots that could allow for either 
the theft or potential alteration of thousands of ballots. These types of operations against 
secure facilities are already part of government red teaming quite frequently, even with 
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targets as sensitive as the Transportation Security Administration and airport access in and 
around magnetometer stations.361  
C. STORAGE OF BALLOTS 
After a ballot is successfully returned via drop box, mail, or in-person to a central 
processing facility or county election office, officials can proceed with administrative 
protocols set in place. Each state determines when ballots will be authorized to be counted 
and what procedures will be followed. Since ballot counting takes place behind closed 
doors, election officials recognized the need to provide transparency to the public by 
creating a tracking system for every ballot cast. Accounting for every ballot at each stage 
of the administrative process is vital to mail-in voting integrity. 
For the process to run smoothly, election officials must hire the appropriate amount 
of bipartisan staff, train the staff, acquire the necessary amount of space and equipment for 
processing, and designate a viewing area for poll watchers. As the ballots arrive, the chain 
of custody will be verified, ballots transferred to trays, and dated and time stamped for 
tracking purposes. To prevent a voter from voting twice, the envelope barcode is scanned, 
or an entry is made in the voter registration affirming receipt of the ballot. Signatures are 
then verified manually or via a scanner and are categorized as accepted or rejected. 
Rejected ballots will be handled accordingly to state election laws, and accepted ballots 
will be opened and separated from signature envelopes. 
Verifying signatures against the voter registration database provides an opportunity 
for a bad actor to disrupt the verification process by conducting a ransomware attack on 
the registration database. A ransomware attack is malware installed on a database that 
encrypts the information that essentially holds the individual’s information until a ransom 
is paid. Over the last year, ransomware attacks have cost hospitals over $7 billion in ransom 
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payments for hospital files’ return.362 The success of the attacks has led to additional 
targets; local and state governments have been victimized.363 
Local and state government records include election administrative systems that 
leave them ripe for an attack.364 Hall County, Georgia, experienced this firsthand in 
October 2020. The county computer system was compromised, which included the voter 
signature database.365 The attack did not significantly impact voters’ ability to vote; it did 
slow down the verification process of the signatures on absentee ballots.366 If several of 
these attacks are done over the country, it could severely impact the Election Day’s 
electoral system.  
After several verification processes are conducted, the privacy envelopes are then 
opened by hand or a machine and run through an optical scanner that records the mark and 
is stored in the computer’s memory. If the machine is unable to verify a mark, a bipartisan 
team of election workers will flag and review it. If a team of two can determine voter intent, 
a new ballot will be completed and run through the scanner. The paper ballots are placed 
back into sorted bins and stored in an evidence vault until 22 days after the election in case 
of an audit or recount.  
Since a voter has the ability to return a ballot to a precinct location, optical scanners 
located at the precinct will be utilized to scan and tally the ballots. The votes are stored on 
a media card and transported in a sealed bag by an individual from each party to the central 
counting location. As an extra security protocol, some states utilize law enforcement as an 
escort to maintain the storage device’s integrity. 
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Physical security of election infrastructure is a crucial component to maintaining 
the integrity of U.S. elections. State and local election officials should ensure they have a 
security plan in place for the storage of election equipment during and after the election. 
Currently, no federal regulations exist dictating how election officials should store 
and secure their voting equipment.367 The storage facility should be treated like an offsite 
government facility, and implement controlled access, security cameras, a buddy system, 
and login procedures.368 J. Alex Halderman, an election infrastructure researcher, recently 
encountered an unattended voting tabulation machine.369 The machine was left 
unprotected in a township hall where anyone could gain access to it.370 Having this type 
of unlimited access to election equipment gives bad actors the ability and time to conduct 
their attack of choice.371 
The lack of security resulted in a warehouse in Philadelphia that houses election 
infrastructure being broken into and items, such as memory cards used to program voting 
machines and a manufacturer’s laptop, were stolen.372 Being in possession of a memory 
card used to program election infrastructure provides a bad actor the opportunity to 
manipulate election results. While it appears no attack took place, it is extremely 
concerning that a storage facility took such little precaution in securing election 
infrastructure.  
Access to funding has caused safeguards for the physical security of election 
infrastructure to vary amongst local election jurisdictions, which can cause bad actors to 
focus their attention on jurisdictions where security is lax and has the greatest effect on the 
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outcome of the election. The impact could be catastrophic if a virus placed by a bad actor 
spreads throughout the entire state system.373 Election officials would argue security 
procedures are in place to prevent these types of attacks, but with a lack of funding and 
knowledge available in certain jurisdictions, it is impossible to ensure all jurisdictions have 
the means and capability to have strong security protocols in place.374 
Red team attacks against storage facilities for election infrastructure devices could 
be approached by locating and identifying the larger storage facility prior to the elections. 
Once voting machines and scanners are delivered to the individual polling locations, it 
would be more difficult to access each location and lead to a greater chance of discovery. 
To identify the storage facility location, a review of the county election website will 
identify election officials for the county. Surveillance of election officials will eventually 
lead to the storage facility’s location; members can then gain insight into the security 
protocols. By locating and accessing machines in the primary storage area, tampering with 
scanners could become easier. Whether or not the machines are actually tampered with, 
just the theft of scanners and voting machines from a low-security storage facility weeks 
before an election can easily sow doubt in the minds of voters as to the validity of any votes 
on Election Day. After a team or individual has gained access, it will be essential to 
determine how long it takes for election officials to notice their facility’s breach and if any 
election devices were exploited. 
D. ELECTION RESULTS 
With over 80 million mail-in ballots cast during the 2020 election, it would be 
impossible for some states to project a winner on election night. Making it even more 
challenging is that some states allow ballots to be counted up to 14 days after the election, 
combined with the opportunity for voters to correct an unreadable ballot. The public may 
not know whom the President is for up to two weeks. Adding to this problem is the fact 
that electronic voting machines can produce immediate results that are then reported to the 
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media. In the case of the 2020 election, results from in-person voting revealed President 
Trump was in the lead in key swing states.  
As the mail-in ballots began to be counted in crucial swing states, the pendulum 
began to swing toward Presidential Candidate Biden. As the polls continued to change in 
favor of Biden, individuals began circulating disinformation posts on social media about 
hundreds of ballots being found in crucial swing states to attack the integrity of the system. 
For example, a social media post began circulating “claiming over a hundred thousand 
votes had been found in Wisconsin.”375 Election officials quickly debunked the rumor and 
stated the rise in votes for Biden resulted from the central count facility completing the 
tally of mail-in ballots, not fraud as claimed.376 
Before the general election, the FBI warned the public to be wary of election 
information being posted on websites or on social media platforms following the closing 
of election polls on November 3.377 An increasing fear rose amongst the Intelligence 
Community that due to the unique circumstances of voting in the 2020 U.S. Presidential 
election, the American public and the world would most likely not know the U.S. 
Presidential election winner on the morning of November 4.378  
The delay in results allowed U.S. adversaries to spread disinformation about the 
2020 U.S. elections and cast further doubt in the minds of American’s about the legitimacy 
of U.S. elections. The FBI encouraged all Americans to bear responsibility for ensuring the 
information came from a valid source before sharing it with others verbally or on social 
media sites.379 
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This nation’s foreign adversaries are not the only challenge to the spread of 
disinformation. The Commander in Chief created a post early on the morning of November 
4 on Twitter claiming victory even though crucial swing states had not revealed a 
winner.380 This type of misinformation can lead to confusion and lack of trust in election 
results.381 Twitter and Facebook immediately flagged the President’s tweet to prevent the 
spread of misinformation.382 The 2020 election was a perfect example of how a 
disinformation campaign against mail-in voting could be used to cause distrust in the U.S. 
electoral system. 
An example of a red teaming attack would consist of members scouring social 
media and blogs to research the various activist groups to identify which group trends the 
most. Once activist groups are chosen, a deep fake video is created showing a prominent 
newscaster airing a news story and video of several crates full of ballots being removed 
from unmarked vehicles and brought in through the back door of a central counting facility 
at 3 a.m. The video will then be circulated to activist groups in an effort to spread 
disinformation and discredit the mail-in ballot process. The Stanford History Education 
Group conducted a study to determine 3,446 high school students’ ability to distinguish 
between what is real or fake on the internet.383 The study revealed approximately 52% of 
students took a video of an individual stuffing ballots as proof of voter fraud in the 2016 
election without attempting to verify the truth.384 The goal of the attacks is to determine 
how quickly social media platforms are able to identify a deep fake and flag the posts as 
disinformation and how effective election officials are in combating the attack. 
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While history had demonstrated fraud is rare when voting by mail, the rapid 
increase in its use in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election exposed vulnerabilities within the 
electoral system. Election officials faced the monumental task of implementing a complex 
system in a short amount of time. Applying systems thinking by mapping out the process 
would have afforded election officials the ability to recognize vulnerabilities prior to 
implementing the change. Unfortunately, some of the quick decisions made with universal 
mail-in voting were made without consideration of how those changes could adversely 
affect other components within the electoral system. Systems mapping would have 
revealed how vital chain of custody procedures were, how severely underfunded and 
understaffed the Postal Service was, and how vulnerable voter registration databases were 
to a ransomware attack. The diagram, as shown in Figure 10, would have afforded the 
officials the ability to pivot and increase security protocols. 
 
Figure 10. Systems Thinking Mapping of the Implementation of Mail-In 
Voting 
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Preparing for future attacks is a key component of securing the U.S. electoral 
system. While nothing is ever 100% secure, planning for what is possible will assist 
election officials in putting protocols in place to mitigate the damage. Thus, red teaming 
could be crucial to election security. Election officials are so busy correcting the problems 
at hand that they neglect to plan for the future. Foreign adversaries are constantly testing 
the U.S. electoral system for vulnerabilities to exploit. By applying red teaming to the U.S. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Any election’s goal is to ensure that all individuals willing and eligible to vote are 
afforded the opportunity and that their votes are accurately counted. While past work by 
election officials, researchers, and legislatures has succeeded in increasing voter 
participation and experienced fewer cases of voter fraud, the system is still experiencing 
challenges that prevents it from obtaining its goal of 100% participation with 100% 
accuracy. In a time when U.S. politics are more polarized than ever, everyone must 
continue to evaluate and reinforce the U.S. electoral system to prevent potential 
vulnerabilities that U.S. adversaries and political opponents can exploit to cast doubt on 
the validity of the system. In the past, election officials have solved challenges within the 
system using linear thinking. They identify the problem at hand and create a solution. What 
election officials may not realize is that the solution may lead to unintended consequences 
in other system components. For example, the 2020 election saw that only addressing the 
problem at hand did indeed create additional challenges to the system, which were then 
used to cast doubt on the validity of the results. This thesis studied how systems thinking 
and red teaming could be applied as a method to evaluate and reinforce the integrity of the 
electoral system.  
Systems thinking provides an opportunity for election officials to study the inner 
workings of the relationships between the various components that make up the electoral 
system and how making a change to one area will directly impact another. Systems thinking 
will help election officials identify potential pitfalls or advantages of the prospective 
changes to the system prior to implementation. Applying systems thinking to the challenge 
of voting in a global pandemic would have helped officials identify the vulnerabilities 
associated with the rapid implementation of universal mail-in voting. By mapping out the 
mail-in voting, officials would have recognized that relaxing security and chain of custody 
protocols, last-minute changes to election laws and procedures, and poor communication 
could lead the public to doubt the integrity of the system. 
Red teaming is not new to the U.S. electoral system. After the 2016 election, the 
Cyber Agency began focusing on how to secure electronic election infrastructure and 
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enlisted the use of red team exercises to test the resilience of electronic critical 
infrastructure and incident response.385 While the agency has made great strides in testing 
and securing the electronic critical infrastructure, the focus now needs to shift to ensure 
security protocols are in place for the physical critical infrastructure, such as storage and 
processing facilities, voting locations, and election officials.386 While the Cyber Agency 
has provided election officials with written guidance on preparing and securing election 
facilities, additional steps need to be taken to protect them from a potential attack.387 The 
recent polarization of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election and the civil unrest ultimately led 
to an attack on the Capitol. While the attacks did not prevent the Joint Session of Congress 
from certifying Joe Biden as the winner of the 2020 election, it did leave a large scar on 
this country’s democracy. Election officials must be prepared in the future for potential 
attacks on election-related facilities. Red team exercises should be conducted on all 
election critical infrastructure to include physical locations to test the durability of security 
protocols and election officials. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the years, election officials and stakeholders have solely focused on the 
current challenge at hand rather than analyzing the system as a whole. The focus becomes 
identifying what the specific problem is and how to fix it before the next election. The 
recent attack on mail-in voting and the electoral system highlighted the need for election 
officials to evaluate why individuals could create a large-scale disinformation campaign 
against mail-in voting. Election officials should explore the incorporation of after-action 
reviews to assess an election’s performance and any problems identified in the election, 
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analyze the process through the lens of systems thinking, and conduct red teaming 
exercises to test the security protocols put in place.  
1. Conducting After-Action Reports through the Use of Systems Thinking 
Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S. military conduct 
after-action reviews of major events to evaluate the performance of the security or response 
plan.388 Often law enforcement agencies conduct after-action reviews following a major 
incident, but after-action reviews are still beneficial in a successful event. After-action 
reviews allow stakeholders to conduct a thorough review of what worked, what needs to 
be improved, and how to reinforce or strengthen the security plan. Agencies or departments 
must continue to conduct a self-examination of security protocols and response plans to 
ensure their effectiveness.  
The U.S. electoral system can benefit from conducting after-action reviews in 
which systems thinking methodologies are utilized for the final analysis. While the U.S. 
electoral system has experienced very little fraud over the years, continuing to study and 
evaluate the resiliency of the system is vital to maintaining this democracy. Conducting 
after-action reviews in each state and local jurisdiction will allow election officials to 
identify vulnerabilities within the system that political opponents or adversaries can 
exploit. Systems thinking will provide the insight needed to determine how the components 
are connected and how to use those relationships to create a solution. Just as law 
enforcement agencies must continue to plan for future attacks, so must election officials.  
First, the head election official for each state will need to establish an after-action 
review’s purpose and size.389 Due to the U.S. electoral system’s decentralized nature, each 
state’s electoral system varies in complexity. It should be analyzed from beginning to end 
to determine how intertwined the subsystems are compared to the system as a whole. 
Unlike after-action reviews conducted by law enforcement personnel or the U.S. military 
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in which each entity has a specific incident or operation to review, election officials must 
consider the process as a whole. Any recommendations made to the electoral process could 
severely impact other areas of the system and inadvertently cause more damage.  
Second, election officials will need to determine if the review will be conducted 
internally or by an outside source or a combination of both.390 Choosing an outsider as 
team lead will ensure impartiality when reviewing the current process in place. When it 
comes to rounding out the team, election officials should seek individuals who have 
election experience and familiarity with the specific state laws. Still, they can also remain 
unbiased while conducting the review. The political component must also be addressed. 
For that reason, the team should be composed of bi-partisan officials to prevent accusations 
of bias towards one party.  
Once the team has been established, team members should seek U.S. stakeholders 
and interview them regarding their role in the system, challenges, if any, they face, and 
provide insight into how they interact directly with the other subsections. Team members 
should highlight the importance of these interviews and how their information can be used 
to reinforce the electoral system. 
The information collected from the stakeholders can then be used to conduct an 
analysis through systems thinking. Team members should begin by mapping out all the 
components that encompass the electoral system. Once the components are identified, 
members can start highlighting how interconnected each of those relationships are and 
begin to identify the system’s strengths and weaknesses. When evaluating vulnerabilities, 
those interconnected relationships must be considered when looking for solutions. Even 
the smallest change could inadvertently affect another component and create an additional 
vulnerability. That diagram will allow the team members to foresee any challenges that 
may arise due to the potential change. This visual can then be presented in a report format 
in conjunction with a set of recommendations to the election officials in each state. 
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2. Executing Red Team Attacks on Non-Cyber Election Infrastructure 
While CISA currently conducts red teaming exercises on cyberinfrastructure, the 
Cyber Agency should expand its red teaming exercises to include all election critical 
infrastructure consisting of postal processing centers, voting machine storage facilities, 
central counting locations, insider attacks at polling stations, among others. Ultimately, a 
red team’s functions frequently involve vulnerability probes with team members assuming 
the role of a potential adversary.391 In these types of attacks, the red teams can test 
defenses, identify shortcomings, document their findings, and report back to the Cyber 
Agency for disbursement to the nation’s election officials. The agency should consult with 
subject matter experts from within the DHS, DOD, and private entities to ascertain the best 
methods of attack employed in previous investigations made by the private sector or 
government agencies.  
The results of those findings, after a formal review, can then be presented to all the 
election stakeholders, particularly the state election officials, in the form of Tabletop 
Exercise Packets. These tabletop exercises are a cost-efficient and productive way for the 
Cyber Agency to share these findings, receive input, and increase critical thinking in all 
stakeholders.392 Presenting these tabletop exercises in the form of an actual, ongoing, 
immediate crisis is also a way for all players to engage with a sense of urgency actively. 
For example, adding the urgency of news reporters calling the Governor’s Office to inquire 
about allegations of ballot tampering by polling station members could be a way of 
increasing pressure on local officials to resolve situations directly in the face of television 
and social media attacks. 
Participants should be notified ahead of time of the tabletop exercises but should 
not be provided any information regarding the scenarios. Although these scenarios are not 
being conducted in the field, they should be treated with a sense of urgency. The scenario 
should be used to put as much pressure as possible on all players, including the poll 
workers, the media relations team, the board of electors, the head county election official, 
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and others. Developing exercise objectives will help organizers identify gaps in the 
stakeholder’s plans; it will allow others to test policies and evaluate the team’s capabilities. 
Time constraints can even be placed on the scenarios to keep the pressure on teams and 
allow the exercise to stay on track. Finally, a summary of the exercise enables all involved 
to dissect what went wrong and create viable solutions.  
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to answer the question: How can red teaming and systems 
thinking be applied to reinforce the integrity of the U.S. electoral system? Over the last 
decade, foreign adversaries and high-raking elected officials have tested the U.S. electoral 
system, which exposed vulnerabilities within the system that must be addressed to preserve 
its integrity. The recent implementation of universal mail-in voting provided the perfect 
case study to test the application of systems thinking and red teaming. Based on the case 
study findings, this thesis recommended two proposals for inserting the use of after-action 
reports in which systems thinking methodologies are utilized for the final analysis and the 
use of vulnerability probes to test the resiliency of election infrastructure. The 
recommendations can identify current and future vulnerabilities within the electoral system 
and provide the opportunity to test solutions prior to implementation. It should be noted 
the recommendations will require buy-in from election stakeholders and will require 
additional funding to obtain the personnel necessary to perform the tasks. While election 
officials must consider the challenges to implementing the recommendations, they must 
also consider the importance of maintaining a secure and resilient electoral system. 
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